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THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF PROXY ACCESS
Marcel Kahan∗ and Edward Rock∗∗

P

ROXY access is the right of shareholders to nominate directors
and to have their nominees included in the company’s proxy
statement. Because proxy access is viewed as dramatically lowering
the costs of an election contest, both proponents and opponents of
proxy access predict that it will have a significant impact. Contrary
to this conventional wisdom, we argue that proxy access will lead to
few shareholder nominations, that most of these nominees will be
defeated, and that the occasional nominee who may get elected will
have little impact.
Based on past involvement in shareholder activism, we believe
that neither mutual funds nor private pension funds would make
significant use of proxy access. Certain large public pension funds
have shown a modest interest in activism and may make some
nominations. The entities with the greatest interests in activism—
hedge funds and union-affiliated funds—would generally not satisfy
the ownership and holding period requirements.
When compared to traditional proxy contests and to withhold
campaigns, proxy access involves significant disadvantages while
promising only modest advantages. The cost savings of proxy access
compared to traditional contests are overstated because most proxy
contest expenses are discretionary campaign expenses or relate to
other expense items that are unaffected by the proxy access rule. By
contrast, the limitations that come with proxy access are significant:
the number of nominees a shareholder can propose is limited; the
level of shareholder support required to gain a seat, as a practical
matter, is increased; the company retains control over the design of
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the proxy cards; and the company retains exclusive access to preliminary voting information.
When compared to withhold-vote campaigns, proxy access has the
advantage that, if it succeeds, it results in the election of a dissident
director. But this benefit must be weighed against countervailing factors that reduce the likelihood of success: the higher level of shareholder support required for success, the greater challenge of positive
versus negative campaigning, and the vulnerability of the dissident
shareholders and their nominees to attacks by the company for lack
of qualification or conflicts of interest. Such attacks will resonate especially for nominees by unions and public pension funds and may
make it difficult to find qualified nominees.
Overall, we believe that proxy access would have some undesirable effects—it would result in some increase in company expenses
and may, rarely, increase the leverage of shareholders whose interests conflict with those of shareholders at large—and some desirable
effects—it may occasionally lead to the election of nominees to recalcitrant boards, where such nominees may have a modest impact
on governance and a marginal impact on company value. None of
these effects is likely to be very material, and the net effect is likely to
be close to zero.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1349
I. THE HISTORY OF PROXY ACCESS ............................................ 1353
A. History .................................................................................. 1353
B. Other Developments............................................................ 1357
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INTRODUCTION
Should shareholders in publicly traded corporations have the
right to have their nominees to the corporate board included in the
proxy statement and ballots mailed out by the company and at the
company’s expense? The highly controversial question has long
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been at the forefront of the corporate governance debate. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) first considered passing rules 60 years ago, and has since released several proposals.1
But although there is significant disagreement among observers
over whether such “proxy access” is desirable, there appears to be
a widespread expectation that proxy access would have major effects on corporate governance. Thus, John G. Finley, formerly a
partner at Simpson Thatcher & Bartlett and now Senior Managing
Director and Chief Legal Officer at Blackstone, remarked that
proxy access is “the biggest change relating to corporate governance ever proposed by the SEC.”2 John Greenwald, in Corporate
Board Member magazine, opined that “few things make boards
more nervous” than proxy access.3 The Chamber of Commerce
viewed proxy access as “extremely significant” and having “enormous impacts”4 and included killing it among its top 5 priorities.5
David Katz and Laura McIntosh, two lawyers at Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, see proxy access as having the “potential to wreak
havoc with American business”6 and an SEC adoption as “unwise
and unnecessary.”7 Michael Garland of CtW Investment Group, a
proxy advisory firm, called proxy access a “new and powerful
tool.”8 The Deal Magazine notes that proxy access would make it
“dramatically less expensive[] for shareholders to nominate direc-

1
See Yin Wilczek, In Historic Rulemaking, SEC Allows Investors to Access Proxies
to Nominate Directors, 42 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA), 1617, 1621 (Aug. 30, 2010).
2
John Greenwald, Hang On, 13 Corp. Bd. Member, First Quarter 2010, at 22, 24.
3
Id.
4
Sarah N. Lynch, Business Groups Gear Up To Fight SEC Proxy Access Proposal,
Dow Jones Newswires, Aug. 18, 2009, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
DJ00000020090818e58i000aq (quoting Tom Quaadman, Executive Director at the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
5
Kara Scannell, Proxy Plan Roils Talks on Finance Rules, Wall St. J., Mar. 17, 2010,
at A2.
6
David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Senate Bill Adversely Affects the Landscape, N.Y. L.J., May 27, 2010, at 5.
7
David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Populists’ Wish Lists Offer Legislative Parade of Horribles, N.Y. L.J., July 23, 2009, at 5; see also David A. Katz & Laura A.
McIntosh, Proxy Access: Not Then, Not Now, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 28, 2006, at 5; David A.
Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, SEC Revisits Shareholder Access to Director Nominations, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 30, 2007, at 5.
8
Joann S. Lublin, New Rule on Proxies Puts Heat on Firms, Wall St. J., Aug. 23,
2010, at B1.
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tors.”9 Brian Cartwright, the former general counsel of the SEC,
regards proxy access as a “grand experiment in politicizing the
leadership” of U.S. corporations.10 The Wall Street Journal has
called it a “high-stakes issue”11 and headlined that proxy access
would “put[] heat on firms.”12 Others call proxy access either
“groundbreaking”13 and “historic,”14 or “fatally flawed”15 and “a giant step backwards.”16 Some predict that proxy access would result
in a “profound effect on the boardroom”17 and help “restore shareholder confidence”;18 others predict that it would “handcuff
boards,”19 generate a “fair amount of litigation,”20 and occupy the
SEC for “years to come.”21
On August 25, 2010, it looked like proxy access was about to become a reality. The Securities and Exchange Commission, over
heavy opposition by corporations and after a close vote along partisan lines, finally adopted a rule granting shareholders proxy access.22 But the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce promptly filed suit to enjoin and invalidate the rule.23 On

9

Steven Epstein & Matthew Soran, Uncle Sam: A Most Effective Shareholder Activist?, TheDeal.com (July 13, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/
community/uncle-sam-a-most-effective-shareholder-activist.php.
10
Editorial, Alinsky Wins at the SEC, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 2010, at A14.
11
Scannell, supra note 5, at A2 (discussing Congressional response to the proxy access legislation).
12
Lublin, supra note 8, at B1.
13
Wilczek, supra note 1, at 1623.
14
Id. at 1621.
15
Id. at 1622 (quoting SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey).
16
Id. at 1623 (quoting U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
17
David Calusdian, Proxy Access: Time to Get Ready for Profound Changes, The
Podium (Nov. 18, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://blog.investorrelations.com/2009/11/18/proxyaccess-time-to-get-ready-for-profound-changes.
18
Walter Calls for Action on Proxy Access, Disclosure, Other Governance Topics,
Corporate Law Daily (BNA) (Feb. 19. 2009), http://0-news.bna.com.pacman.law.
du.edu/cldn/display/batch_print_display.adp?searchid=14113940 (attributing phrase
to SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter).
19
Wilczek, supra note 1, at 1623 (quoting Business Roundtable).
20
Id. at 1622 (quoting John Olson, a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP).
21
Id. (quoting SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey).
22
See Wilczek, supra note 1, at 1621.
23
Petition for Review at 2, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29,
2010). The SEC agreed to stay the effectiveness of the proxy access rules pending
resolution of the lawsuit. See U.S. Chamber and Business Roundtable Commend
SEC’s Decision to Grant Stay on Proxy Access Rule, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
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July 22, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the proxy access rule due to the SEC’s failure to assess its
24
economic effects adequately. As of this writing, the SEC has yet
to determine whether to appeal the court decision, revise or reissue
the rule after performing the missing analysis, or drop its effort to
grant proxy access.
In this Article, we will argue that, contrary to the views expressed by the commentators, proxy access would have little impact on corporate governance. Even if the SEC’s rule is ultimately
validated or a different rule is adopted, few shareholders would use
proxy access to make nominations, very few of the nominees would
succeed in getting elected to boards, and the rare nominee who
does get elected would make little difference on the way companies are run and would have even less of an effect on company
value. While the specifics of our analysis consider the rule adopted
by the SEC in 2010, our general arguments apply to any revised
rule that may be adopted by the SEC, which is likely to be narrower than the 2010 rule, as well as to the prior proposals, some of
which were broader than the 2010 rule.
Rather, the whole concept of proxy access, in our view, is based
on a fallacy: the erroneous belief that it is the costs associated with
distributing a proxy statement that accounts for the failure of
shareholders to wage more successful proxy contests. Accordingly,
all the effort that shareholder activists have poured into proxy access, even if they ultimately succeed in getting a valid rule adopted,
will be wasted.
In Part I of this Article, we discuss the history of the proxy access rule, describe the rule adopted by the SEC in greater detail,
and place it in the context of some other recent developments related to the shareholder franchise. Part II analyzes the status quo
of contested and uncontested shareholder votes and examines what
type of shareholders are likely both to satisfy the qualifications for
making proxy access nominations and to be interested in engaging
in activism via proxy access. Parts III and IV assess the advantages
and disadvantages of proxy access relative to, respectively, tradi(Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2010/october/us-chamberand-business-roundtable-commend-secs-decision-grant-stay-prox.
24
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14988 (D.C. Cir.
July 22, 2011).
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tional proxy contests and withhold votes. In Part V, we discuss the
marginal impact proxy access would have on corporate governance. We close with a brief conclusion.
I. THE HISTORY OF PROXY ACCESS
A. History
The recently enacted, and for the time being vacated, rules on
proxy access are the product of a long and tortured history. In
1942,25 and then again in 1977,26 the SEC expressed some interest in
giving shareholders the opportunity to use the company’s proxy
materials to solicit votes in director elections, but ended up taking
no action. Things started heating up in 2003, when the SEC again
issued a proposal on proxy access for comments. Under the 2003
proposal, shareholders would obtain proxy access for the two years
following a triggering event—either a 35% or more “withhold”
vote in a director election or a majority vote by shareholders electing to make the company subject to proxy access.27 Under that proposal, shareholders who held at least 5% of the company’s stock
for a minimum of 2 years would have been able to make nominations for some of the board seats.28
From its beginning, the 2003 proposal was highly controversial.
It was initially adopted by a vote of 3-2, with the Republican
25
See Security and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493,
H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong. 17–19 (1943) (testimony of Chairman Ganson Purcell that the SEC
solicited comments on staff proposal); Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act
Release No. 3347, Holding Company Act Release No. 3988, Investment Company
Act Release No. 417 (Dec. 18, 1942) (stating that “[a] number of the suggestions proposed by the staff were not adopted,” including the suggestion related to shareholder
access to the company’s proxy material). No action was taken.
26
Staff of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rep.: Review of the Proxy
Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors 3 (July 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf.
27
Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,790, 60,791 (Oct. 23,
2003), reprinted in [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, at
88,409, 88,410 (Oct. 14, 2003).
28
Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,794 (Oct. 23, 2003), reprinted in [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101, at 88,413–
88,414 (Oct. 14, 2003).
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Chairman Donaldson siding with the two Democratic commissioners.29 The Business Roundtable (an association of CEOs of leading
U.S. companies) and the Chamber of Commerce were strongly opposed.30 Donaldson ended up not pushing for an adoption of the
proxy rules and resigned in 2005.31 His successor, Christopher Cox,
was not regarded as a champion of proxy access, and proxy access
was considered dead.
Dissatisfied champions of proxy access therefore decided to
adopt an alternative strategy. In 2005, the American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) made a
shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8 to American International
Group (AIG) seeking to implement a homemade proxy access regime through a bylaw amendment.32 The SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance took the position that AIG could omit this proposal
under Rule 14a-8(i)(8).33 AIG did, and AFSCME sued. In 2006, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the proposal could not be excluded.34 In its opinion, the court was highly
critical of the SEC, berating it for changing its position on the
meaning of its rules without either acknowledging so or explaining
the reasons for it.35 The Court of Appeals’s ruling meant that the
SEC had to act, both to clarify its rules and to remedy the shortcomings the court had noted.
And act it did—sort of. In July 2007, the SEC released for comment two alternative proposals. One resembled the 2003 proxy access proposal. The other would have provided a reasoned basis for
the position that a shareholder proposal trying to implement proxy
29
See Jonathan Peterson, SEC Offers Conflicting Shareholder Proposals, L.A.
Times, July 26, 2007, at C3 (stating that Chairman Donaldson and the SEC’s Democratic commissioners supported the SEC’s 2003 proposal).
30
See Bill Baue, Opening Up Pandora’s Box: SEC Proxy Roundtable Questions
Role
of
Non-Binding
Resolutions,
SocialFunds
(May
15,
2007),
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2293.html (“The SEC allowed the rule it
proposed in October 2003, allowing shareowners proxy access to nominate directors
in certain circumstances, to die on the vine due to opposition by the Business Roundtable and the US Chamber of Commerce, which threatened a lawsuit.”).
31
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C.’s Chairman is Stepping Down from Split Panel, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 2005, at A1.
32
AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2006).
33
Id. at 124.
34
Id. at 129–30.
35
Id. at 129.
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access for a single company can be excluded under Rule 14a-8.
Each proposal was supported by only 3 of the 5 commissioners—
the first by the 2 Democratic commissioners and Chairman Cox,
the second by Cox and the 2 other Republican commissioners.36 In
November 2007, the 3 Republican commissioners adopted the second proposal.37
A year later, Barack Obama was elected President. Cox resigned
and was succeeded by Mary Schapiro.38 With Cox having been replaced by an Obama nominee, the SEC, in June 2009, released another variant of a proposed proxy access rule—again in a 3-2 vote.39
The 2009 proposal was broader than the 2003 proposal: it removed
the requirement of a triggering event, it lowered the percentage
ownership requirement for making a nomination to 1%–5%, depending on company size, and it shortened the required holding
period to 1 year.40 Predictably, reactions were mixed, with some
groups strongly opposed and others strongly in favor. But even
some of the market participants who favored proxy access in general suggested that the 2009 proposal be made more restrictive.41
For example, in its comment letter to the SEC, Barclays Global Investors, a major institutional holder that manages $1.5 trillion in
assets, favored both the reintroduction of the triggers in the 2003
36

See Nicholas Rummell, SEC Splits Proxy Access Votes as Cox Says ‘Yea’ to Two
Proposals, Fin. Wk. (July 25, 2007, 6:11 PM), http://www.financialweek.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070725/REG/70725013/1036 (describing how the first
proposal would allow shareholders to put forth proxy proposals calling for bylaw
changes to allow shareholder-approved directors during corporate elections and how
the second would restate the SEC’s position prior to the Second Circuit’s invalidation).
37
L. Reed Walton, The SEC Denies Proxy Access, RiskMetrics Group Blog (Nov.
30, 2007, 10:33 AM), http://blog.riskmetrics.com/gov/2007/11/the-sec-denies-proxyaccesssubmitted-by-l-reed-walton-publications.html.
38
See Randall Smith & Kara Scannell, Regulator Schapiro to Run SEC for Obama,
Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A1.
39
Georgeson Inc. & Latham & Watkins LLP, Proxy Access Proposed Rules Published
by
SEC,
Corp.
Governance
Comment.
(June
15,
2009),
http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/corp_gov_commentary.html.
40
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046,
Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74
Fed. Reg. 29,032, 29,037, 29,063 (June 18, 2009).
41
See generally Corporate Law Daily (BNA) (Aug. 20. 2010), available at
http://news.bna.com/cldn/CLDNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=17646623&vname=ccdb
ulallissues&fn=17646623&jd=a0c4a1c0v3&split=0 (noting that institutional investors
favor a 3% threshold).
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proposal and an increase in the ownership threshold needed to
make a nomination to 5%–15%, depending on the company’s
market capitalization.42 T. Rowe Price Associates, a mutual fund
complex with about $190 billion in assets, favored a 5% ownership
threshold for all companies, noting that it owned more than 5% of
the stock in more than 350 U.S. operating companies.43 Moreover,
managerial interests raised the argument that the proposed rule
exceeded the SEC’s rulemaking authority.44
To insulate any rule against such a legal attack, the SEC delayed
action until Congress, as part of the financial reform bill, granted
the disputed authority to the SEC.45 President Obama signed the
finance reform bill on July 21, 2010, and the SEC adopted the
proxy access rule on August 25, 2010. Under the adopted rule, the
ownership requirement was set at a uniform level of 3% for all
companies.46 Shareholders can pool their shares to form a group
that satisfies the ownership threshold. If more than 10 other shareholders are solicited in the effort to form such a group, the soliciting shareholder must file a disclosure statement with the SEC. The
3% ownership requirement must be satisfied as of the date the
nomination is made and for the preceding 3 years.47 Since nominations must be made no later than 120 days before the anniversary
of the company’s mailing of the previous year’s proxy statement,48
and the nominating shareholders must intend to maintain their
42
Annette L. Nazareth, SEC Urged to Defer Adopting Proxy Access Rules, Harv.
L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance and Fin. Reg. (Oct. 6, 2009, 9:01 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/10/06/sec-urged-to-defer-adopting-proxyaccess-rules.
43
Id.
44
See Kevin Drawbaugh, US CEO Lobby Doubts SEC Authority on Proxy Access,
Reuters, Jan. 16, 2004; Rachelle Younglai, SEC Aims for Proxy Access Rules in 2nd
Quarter, Reuters, Apr. 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE63Q47T20100427.
45
See Jeff Morgan, SEC Proxy Access Vote Delayed Until Early 2010, National Investor Relations Institute (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.niri.org/Main-Menu-Category/
advocate/Presidents-Note/SEC-Proxy-Access-Vote-Delayed-Until-Early-2010.aspx.
46
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(1) (2010). However, for very small issues (with a public
float of less than $75 million), the effective date of the rule was delayed for 3 years.
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75
Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
47
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(2) (2010).
48
Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(10).
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ownership until the date of the meeting,49 the rule effectively imposes a 3-and-1/3-year holding period on nominating shareholders.
As in the proposed rule, nominations may only be made for up to
25% of the board seats. No nominations may be made by a shareholder who seeks to change control of the company or to gain a
number of seats in excess of the maximum permitted by the rule.50
A nominee’s candidacy may not violate the law or any stock exchange rules, the nominee must meet stock exchange rule independence criteria, and the nominating shareholder must file a new
Schedule N containing certain disclosures.51
Promptly after the proxy access rule was adopted, the Business
Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce filed suit to enjoin and
invalidate it.52 On July 22, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit vacated the proxy access rule, holding that the rule was
“arbitrary and capricious” due to the SEC’s failure to assess its
53
economic effects adequately. As of this writing, the SEC has yet
to determine whether to appeal the ruling, revise or reissue the
rule after performing the missing analysis, or drop its effort to
grant proxy access. But given the checkered history of proxy access, we would be surprised if the Court of Appeals opinion presented the last word in this long saga.
B. Other Developments
Between 2003, when the Donaldson commission released its
proxy access proposal, and 2010, when the Schapiro commission
adopted its variant of proxy access, several notable developments
occurred. Shareholders realized the power they can wield by “just
voting no.” Many companies switched their election regime from
49

Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(5).
Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(6).
51
Id. § 240.14a-11(b)(8)–(10). The requirements of Schedule N are further discussed
at Table 4, infra.
52
Petition for Review at 2, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29,
2010). The SEC has agreed to stay the effectiveness of the proxy access rules pending
resolution of the lawsuit. See U.S. Chamber and Business Roundtable Commend
SEC’s Decision to Grant Stay on Proxy Access Rule, U.S. Chamber of Commerce
(Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2010/october/us-chamberand-business-roundtable-commend-secs-decision-grant-stay-prox.
53
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, No. 10-1305, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14988 (D.C. Cir.
July 22, 2011).
50
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plurality voting to some form of majority voting. Discretionary
broker voting in director elections was eliminated. And finally,
Delaware law was clarified to permit shareholders to adopt tailormade, firm-specific proxy access rules. These developments have
reduced—in our view, significantly—the impact, usefulness, and
need for a federal rule on proxy access. In this Section, we describe
these developments in greater detail.
In uncontested director elections—and the overwhelming majority of elections are uncontested—the only choice for shareholders
who do not want to vote for a board nominee is to mark their
proxy card (or voting instruction form) to withhold authority to
vote for the director at issue. Shareholders have long had the ability to return a proxy card but withhold the vote for a director. Until
recently, however, shareholders have taken little note of it.
The intellectual origin of shareholders withholding their votes
lies in a 1990 presentation to large institutional investors by former
SEC Commissioner, and then-professor at Stanford law, Joe
Grundfest. Grundfest proposed that shareholders “just vote no” in
director elections.54 Though under the plurality voting system that
prevailed at the time, withhold votes would have no legal effect no
matter how many were cast,55 he argued that the symbolic impact of
withhold votes, especially when coupled with shareholder communications with management, could act as an annual referendum on
managerial performance and “be a catalyst for improved oversight
that would benefit all corporate constituencies, as well as the economy at large.”56 In particular, Grundfest expected that
[a] successful “just vote no” campaign can induce internal reforms as a result of social pressures that lead board members to
engage in more effective monitoring. Alternatively, a substantial
“just vote no” turnout can increase the probability of a hostile
proxy contest or tender offer that will be treated more kindly by

54

Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 857, 867 (1993).
55
As discussed below, in an uncontested election under plurality voting, each nominee is elected as long as she receives a single affirmative vote. See infra text accompanying note 190.
56
Grundfest, supra note 54, at 866.
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the courts precisely because it follows a significant “just vote no”
57
turnout.

Although there was some early enthusiasm for the initiative,58 it
took a number of years before Grundfest’s proposal caught on.
The turning point probably was in the 2004 Disney board election,59
when 45% of the shares were withheld from Disney CEO Michael
Eisner.60 This campaign was highly publicized for a variety of reasons: it involved a large entertainment company; it pitted Eisner
against Roy Disney, the nephew of the legendary founder of the
company; and Roy Disney spent more than $2 million in campaigning for shareholders to vote “no.”61 Even though Eisner received a
majority of the votes cast, the board of Disney immediately
stripped him of his position as chairman62 and Eisner resigned as
CEO the following year.63 The Disney withhold campaign showed
shareholders that, in the right circumstances, a high withhold vote
is both achievable and effective in inducing governance changes.
In the wake of the rise of withhold campaigns, it also dawned on
shareholders that there is something wrong with an election system
in which a director can be elected even if a large majority of shareholders is opposed. As a result, shareholders began pushing for
some form of majority voting. It seems that the arguments against
plurality voting struck a chord. Within a short span, most large
companies discarded the old plurality voting regime and adopted
57

Id. at 927.
Id. at 866–67 & n.33 (citing press reports commenting on the increased popularity
of the initiative).
59
See Andrew Countryman, Shareholders Renewing “Just Vote No” Campaigns,
Chi. Trib., Feb. 11, 2005, § 3, at 4 (quoting Patrick McGurn, a corporate governance
expert at Institutional Shareholders Service, as saying “[w]ithhold-vote campaigns
came of age in 2004, and they emerged as the dominant tactic for shareholder activists . . . .”).
60
See Laura M. Holson & Geraldine Fabrikant, Disney Chief to Leave, Setting Off
Race for Job, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2004, at C3.
61
See Matt Kelly, Proxy Access Update: A Review of Likelihood, Costs, Compliance Wk. (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.complianceweek.com/article/1219/proxy-accessupdate-a-review-of-likelihood-costs.
62
See Steven J. Spencer & Young J. Woo, Considerations for “Just Vote No” Campaigns, Activist Investment Developments, Schulte, Roth & Zabel, LLP 1 (Fall 2006),
http://www.srz.com/files/News/5333c42b-1659-4caf-9540-c10b4a6a038c/Presentation/
NewsAttachment/26d52d60-ac91-404e-8bbd-67bfae1332d0/filesfilesArticle%20-%20
AI%20-%20fall06%20-%20Considerations.pdf.
63
See Exit Eisner, L.A. Times, Sept. 30, 2005, at B10.
58
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some form of majority voting. Thus, the percentage of S&P 500
companies with some form of majority voting increased from 16%
in February 2006 and 66% in November 200764 to about 80% in
2010.65 S&P 500 companies account for about 75% of the aggregate
capitalization of the U.S. stock market.66 Among smaller companies, majority voting so far remains much less prevalent: of 5930
companies outside the S&P 500 that are followed by RiskMetrics,
only 17% had adopted some form of majority voting by 2009.67 But
still, it is clear that majority voting has been a big success, is already
in effect for a majority of U.S. companies when weighted by capitalization, and is likely to be adopted by many more companies in
future years.
A third change occurred with respect to the ability of brokers to
vote shares held in their customers’ brokerage accounts. Most individual shareholders in the U.S. hold their shares through brokers
and are not the record holders of those shares.68 When a company
solicits proxies, it sends proxy materials to the brokers, which then
forward them to their customers together with a form on which the
customers can mark voting instructions.69 If the customer does not
return these instructions, and the issue is designated as “routine”
by the NYSE, the broker can vote the uninstructed shares in its
discretion—which usually means in accordance with management
recommendations.70

64

Claudia H. Allen, Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, Neal, Gerber &
Eisenberg, LLP i (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majoritystudy
111207.pdf.
65
See Press Release, California Public Employees’ Retirement System, CalPERS
2010 Majority Vote Initiative Successful at Top Companies (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-archive/pr-2010/dec/2010majority-vote.xml.
66
See Data Series: SP500, S&P 500 Index, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Jul.
26, 2010, 10:01 AM ), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/SP500.
67
See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 Bus. Law. 329, 343 (2010) (citing figures supplied to the authors by RiskMetrics).
68
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96
Geo. L.J. 1227, 1237 (2008) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Hanging Chads].
69
Id. at 1243–48 (describing the process of how nominee shares are voted).
70
Id. at 1250.
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Until 2010, all uncontested director elections were treated as
routine71—including the Disney board election in 2004 and subsequent elections in which active withhold campaigns were waged.
As of January 1, 2010, the NYSE no longer treats any director election as routine.72 As a result, when a shareholder does not return
voting instructions to the broker, these shares are not voted in the
election of directors.
Finally, while proxy access was waxing and waning at the SEC,
Delaware law made clear that shareholders had broad powers to
adopt bylaws governing proxy access. In 2008, the Delaware Supreme Court held in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension
Plan73 that provisions facilitating the nomination of director candidates by shareholders can be included in bylaws—which can be
adopted by shareholders without board approval74—and need not
be included in the certificate of incorporation (which can only be
changed upon a board recommendation).75 The following year, the
Delaware legislature adopted a new Section 112 that explicitly allows corporations to adopt proxy access via bylaw.76 Under that
section, the bylaws may provide that individuals nominated by a
stockholder will be included in the corporation’s proxy solicitation
materials and its form of proxy, subject to the procedures and con71

NYSE Rule 451, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2451 (Dec. 2009); NYSE Rule 452, 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2452 (Dec. 2009). Since NYSE exchange rules effectively
govern all brokers, this rule applies to all publicly traded companies, regardless of
where their stock is listed for trading.
72
See Julie Connelly, What the Amended Rule 452 Means to You, Corp. Bd. Member,
Third
Quarter
2009,
available
at
http://www.boardmember.com/
MagazineArticle_Details.aspx?id=3880 (explaining the change in NYSE Rule 452 and
ramifications for director elections).
73
953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008).
74
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 109(a) (Supp. 2010).
75
See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism:
Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 495–96
(2003) (distinguishing between unilateral and bilateral governance changes).
76
H.R. 19, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009); see also Comment Letter
from James L. Holzman, Chair, Council of the Corp. L. Section of the Del. Bar Ass’n,
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Sec. & Exchange Commission 4 (July 24, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-65.pdf. For an analysis of
the jurisdictional interaction between Delaware and the federal government regarding proxy access, see Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s Vote and its Political
Economy, in Delaware and in Washington (Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper No.
2011-94,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1884110.
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ditions provided in the bylaw. These conditions may include a
minimum level or duration of ownership, submission of specified
information, and limitations on parties seeking control. In principle, therefore, if a majority of shareholders of a company want
proxy access, they have the power to adopt a proxy access bylaw, at
least in most Delaware companies.77 Unlike the SEC’s proxy access
rule, Section 112 embodies an “enabling” approach to corporate
governance, as it permits each company to determine for itself
whether to have proxy access, and if so, which shareholders should
be eligible to make nominations, rather than imposing the same
“one size fits all” approach on all companies.78
II. THE STATUS QUO: UNCONTESTED AND CONTESTED
PROXY SOLICITATIONS
Before considering how proxy access may change the existing
system, we need to describe briefly how the existing system works.

77
Though Section 112 became effective in August 2009, we are not aware of any
shareholder proposal during the 2010 proxy season that tried to use Section 112 to opt
into a homemade proxy access rule. While this may indicate a lack of demand, it could
also be due to the fact that shareholders’ rights advocates were awaiting the likely
adoption of the SEC proxy access rule. Moreover, without changes in federal law, a
proxy access rule under Section 112 would have created some tensions with the antifraud provision in the proxy rules: to the extent that the company’s proxy statement
includes information provided by a nominating shareholder, and that information is
materially false or misleading, the company would have violated Rule 14a-9. The new
federal proxy access rule makes it a violation for a nominating shareholder to cause a
company to include materially false or misleading information regarding a proxy access nomination under federal or state law, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2010), and exculpates the company from any liability for false or misleading statements supplied by
a nominating shareholder in Schedule 14N or otherwise, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(f)
(2010). It is not entirely clear whether this exculpation applies to information furnished under Section 112. However, prior to the adoption of the federal proxy access
rule, the clear lack of any exculpation may have made a company wary of adopting
proxy access under Section 112.
78
The lack of any ability of companies to opt out of proxy access formed part of the
basis for Commissioner Paredes’s opposition to the SEC’s approach. See, e.g., Troy
A. Paredes, Comm’r, Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Speech at the 22nd Annual
Tulane Corporate Law Institute (April 15, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch041510tap.htm).
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A. Uncontested Solicitations
There are approximately 6000 firms listed on the NYSE, the
AMEX, and the NASDAQ, including foreign issuers.79 The Wilshire 5000 index, which now includes around 4000 companies,80 endeavors to cover the entire U.S. equity market and includes every
equity security with its primary market listing in the U.S. It drops
issues which stop trading for 10 consecutive days (which then are
typically listed, if at all, on the “Pink Sheets”).81 Most of these
companies hold shareholder meetings once a year and solicit proxies for these meetings82 under the federal proxy rules.83
All but a handful of these meetings are utterly routine. As one
would predict, the solicitation of proxies for the uncontested an79
NYSE: 2600 listed operating companies, including 450 from outside the U.S. See
A Guide to the NYSE Marketplace, NYSE Group 3 (2006), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nyse_bluebook.pdf. AMEX: 539 listed companies, including closed-end funds and non-U.S. issuers. See NYSE and NYSE AMEX Equities
Membership, NYSE Euronext, Inc., http://www.nyse.com/membership/equities/nyse
(last visited Sept. 2, 2011). NASDAQ: 2852 listed companies as of December 31, 2009.
See NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 18, 2010).
Total: 6009 companies.
80
Wilshire Fundamental Characteristics, Wilshire Indexes (April 29, 2011),
http://web.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html.
81
See Description of Wilshire 5000 Total Market Index, Wilshire Indexes,
http://web.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/ (last visited May 17, 2011). The
“Pink Quotations” or “Pink Sheets”—an electronic quotation system that displays
quotes for typically inactively traded over-the-counter securities—are so called because the quotes were originally published on pink colored paper by the National
Quotation Bureau (NQB). They are currently published by NQB’s successor, OTC
Markets Group, Inc., which recently changed its name from Pink OTC Markets, Inc.
See History of OTC Markets Group, OTC Markets, http://www.otcmarkets.com/
about/otc-markets-history (last visited May 17, 2011).
82
We have described this complex system previously. See Kahan & Rock, Hanging
Chads, supra note 68 at 1233–47. It is also the subject of a recent SEC release. See
Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 62,495, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,340, 75 Fed. Reg. 42,982, 42,984 (July 22, 2010).
83
Other estimates indicate that there are somewhere around 13,000 shareholder
meetings for public companies per year at which around 600 billion shares are voted.
2009 Proxy Season: Key Statistics & Performance Ratings, Broadridge Investor
Communication Solutions 2 (2009), available at http://www.broadridge.com/investorcommunications/us/2009ProxyStats.pdf. The difference between the 13,000 estimate
of meetings and the 6000–7000 estimate of public companies is probably due to (1)
the fact that companies sometimes hold more than one meeting per year, (2) the inclusion of companies that trade only on pink sheets, and (3) the inclusion of investment companies in the former figure.
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nual meeting is likewise fairly routine. Counsel for the company
must produce a proxy statement that complies with the requirements of Schedule 14A. That proxy statement along with a proxy
card—or, in the case of indirect holding, a request for instructions
(a VIF or “voting instruction form”)—is then distributed to the
shareholders, proxies and instructions are collected, votes are tabulated, and the results are reported.
Total costs of the annual proxy solicitation usually fall in the
$10,000 to $100,000 range. For example, at Air Products & Chemicals (market capitalization $15.4 billion), the 2010 annual proxy solicitation cost around $80,000, of which $35,700 was paid to
Broadridge84 (covering the distribution to street holders, registered
holders, and employee plan participants as well as hosting meeting
materials on their website); $14,000 was paid to Morrow & Co. (for
acting as proxy solicitor); and $30,000 was paid to RR Donnelley
(for proxy printing and EDGAR preparation).85 The proxy statement itself was produced in house.
B. Contested Solicitations
In contrast to the routine uncontested proxy solicitation for the
annual meeting, a proxy contest for control, or even a “short slate”
contest in which the dissidents seek to elect only a minority of directors, is much closer to a political campaign. It typically involves
telephone solicitations, presentations to institutional investors,
multiple mailings to shareholders, and sometimes newspaper advertisements and litigation.
Contested solicitations are relatively infrequent. According to
data compiled by Georgeson, a proxy solicitation firm, the number
of contested solicitations from 1981 to 2009 has ranged from a low
of 3 (in 1993) to a high of 57 (in 2009), with a general trend upwards beginning in the mid 1990s. Since there are over 6,000 publicly traded companies, this means that over 99% of all votes are
uncontested. In Table 1, we present data on the cost to dissidents

84
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”), formerly a unit of Automatic
Data Processing, Inc. (“ADP”), is the market’s leading provider of investor communications, including proxy mailing and vote processing services.
85
Email from John Stanley, General Counsel, Air Products & Chemicals, Inc., to
Marcel Kahan (July 30, 2010) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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and companies of waging a contest in 2009.86 Dissident costs varied
widely, from a low of $30,000 to a high of $9 million for Ackman’s
(unsuccessful) contested solicitation at Target. Unsurprisingly,
costs tended to be higher for larger companies (as measured by
their market capitalization) than for smaller ones. For companies
with a capitalization of less than $300 million, the average (median)
costs amounted to $267,000 ($200,000); for companies with a capitalization between $300 million and $1 billion, the average (median) costs amounted to $643,000 ($275,000); and for companies
with a capitalization of above $1 billion, the average (median) costs
were $2.17 million ($1.15 million).
Table 1: 2009 Contested Solicitations (Source: Georgeson and Independent Research)
Company

Dissident

Market
Issue
Cap $mil

Co.
Costs
$1000

Diss.
Costs
$1000

Diss.
Stake

Outcome

Online
Resources

Tennenbaum
Cap Part

2

Directors

650

550

21.90%

Dissidents

Rancher
Energy

Andrei
Stytsenko

4

Directors

*

30

1.30%

Dissidents

Asure Software

Red Oak/
Pinnacle

9

Directors

*

100

10.30%

Dissidents

Wilshire
Enterprises

Full Value
Part.

9

Directors

150

30

18.60%

Settled

Advocat Inc.

Bristol Inv.
Fund

15

Directors

175

150

7.40%

Mgmt

Whitney Inf.
Network

Kingstown
Part.

17

Directors

*

50

11.50%

Dissidents

Hooper
Holmes, Inc.

R. V.
Aprahamian

18

Directors

160

150

4.40%

Dissidents

VaxGen

VaxGen Full
Value Comm.

23

Directors

*

*

*

Mgmt

Premier
Exhibitions

Sellers Cap.

35

Consent
to Elect
Directors

350

500

16.30%

Dissidents

Fauquier
Bankshares

D. M. Van
Roijen

43

Directors

200

75–
100

7.30%

Mgmt

86

We use the cost estimates provided by companies and challengers in their proxy
statements, as required by Schedule 14A. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 4 (2010).
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Diss.
Costs
$1000

Diss.
Stake

Outcome

Neuberger
Berman Dividend Adv, Fd.

Western
Investment

53

Directors;
Opp. Mgmt 250
Agr.

150

9.90%

Settled

ORBCOMM,
Inc.

John C.
Levinson

58

Directors

475

495

1.10%

Withdrawn

Trico Marine
Services

Kistefos AS

59

Directors

1200

1700

21.00%

Mgmt

iPass Inc.

Foxhill Opp.
Master Fd

62.5

Directors

750

300

7.00%

Settled

California
Micro Devices

Dialectic
Cap. Mgmt

64

Directors

350

375

8.80%

Dissidents

Penwest Phar- Tang Cap.
maceuticals
Part.

64

Directors

875

450

21.10%

Dissidents

Tollgrade
Comm.

Ramius LLC

67

Directors

400

200

15.50%

Dissidents

Mac-Gray
Corp.

Fairview Cap.
Inv.

71

Directors

250

350

6.30%

Split

Quigley Corp.

Ted Karkus

77

Directors

*

250

*

Dissidents

95

Vote
Against
Liquidation

330

55

16.50%

Dissidents/
Settled

DWS RREEF
Susan L.
Real Estate
Ciciora Trust
Fund
Avigen Inc.

Biotechnology Value
Fund

<100

Remove/
Replace
Directors

*

150

30.00%

Mgmt

BellaVista
Capital

MacKenzie
Patterson
Fuller

<100

Remove/
Replace
Directors

79.5

20

12.40%

Mgmt

Cavalier
Homes Inc

Cavalier
Homes
Comm. for
Change

<100

Directors

*

225

9.60%

Settled

Charlotte
Russe Holding

KarpReilly
Cap. Partners

<100

Directors

*

295

8.90%

Withdrawn

CNS Response

Leonard J
Brandt

<100

Remove/
Replace
Directors

*

*

32.00%

Mgmt

Concord
Milestone
Plus

Everest Mgmt

<100

Remove
Gen. Partner

*

10

11.30%

Dissidents
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Diss.
Stake

Outcome

Insured
Municipal
Income Fund

Bulldog
Investors

<100

Directors/Inv.
Policies

*

100

10.80%

Dissidents

IPC Holdings

Validus
Holdings

<100

Opp. to
Amalgamation

*

*

*

Dissidents

IPC Holdings

Validus
Holdings

<100

Call Sp.
Meeting

*

*

*

Dissidents

LCA Vision,
Inc.

The LCAVision Full
Value Comm.

<100

Remove/
Replace
Directors

*

*

*

Withdrawn

Specialty
Underwriters’
Alliance

Hallmark Fin.
Services

<100

Directors

275

250

9.90%

Split

Sun-Times
Media Group

Davidson
Kempner
Cap. Mgmt

<100

Consent
to Replace
Directors

445

415

5.90%

Dissidents

TM Ent. and
Media

Opportunity
Part.

<100

Expand
Bd; Directors

*

25

18.50%

Settled

Agilysys Inc.

Ramius LLC

100

Directors

*

250

12.50%

Settled

Tier
Technologies

Discovery
Equity Part.

119

Directors

*

162.
5

9.90%

Dissidents

CPI Corp

Ramius LLC

122

Directors

*

200

23.00%

Mgmt

Providence
Service Corp.

Prov Comm

128

Directors

445

250

17.90%

Mgmt

Tecumseh
Products

Herrick
Found.

171

Directors

*

700

15.20%

Dissidents

ConsolidatedTomoka Land
Co.

Wintergreen
Fund

204

Directors

*

100

25.90%

Split

Conseco

Otter Green
Mgmt

233

Director

245

225

0.80%

Dissidents

Myers
Industries

GAMCO
Asset Mgmt

304

Directors

*

25

9.60%

Mgmt

Orthofix
International

Ramius LLC

308

Directors

650

250

5.50%

Mgmt

Orthofix
International

Ramius LLC

308

Consent
to Call
Meeting

*

*

5.50%

Dissidents

Adaptec, Inc.

Steel Part.

389

Remove/
Replace
Directors

700

275

10.90%

Dissidents
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Co.
Costs
$1000

Diss.
Costs
$1000

Diss.
Stake

Outcome

Directors

1800

750

2.60%

Withdrawn

781

W/hold on
Directors/
Repeal
Class Bd

*

575

1.50%

Mgmt/Dissi
dent

E. Dabah &
Comm.

908

Directors

1500

2350

21.80%

Settled

Emulex Corp.

Broadcom
Corp.

922

Call Sp.
Meeting

900

*

0.00%

Withdrawn

Chemed
Corp.

MMI Investments

960

Directors

1500

275

3.60%

Mgmt

PHH Corp.

Pennant Cap.
Mgmt

1000

Directors

325

600

9.90%

Dissidents

Texas Industries

Shamrock
Activist Value
Fund

1108

Directors

600

1000

10.20%

Dissidents

Amylin

Icahn

1619

Directors/
Reincorp

7000

650

9.20%

Split/Mgmt

Amylin

Eastbourne
Cap.

1619

Directors

7000

2500

12.20%

Split

CF Industries
Holdings

Agrium Inc.

4968

Withhold
on
Directors

250

1300

2.60%

Mgmt

NRG Energy

Exelon

6227

Dir.; Exp.
Board

3000

1300

0.00%

Settled

Biogen Idec

Carl Icahn

14137

Directors

9200

1000

5.60%

Split

Target Corp.

Pershing
Square

34909

Directors

11100

9000

7.80%

Mgmt

Market
Issue
Cap $mil

Company

Dissident

Federal Signal Corp.

W. B. Kanders

399

Saks Inc.

P. Schoenfeld
Asset Mgmt

Children’s
Place Retail
Stores

* Not disclosed.
Market capitalization “<100” is authors’ estimate.

To examine contested solicitations more closely, we collected
detailed information about all the contests waged between 2005
and 2009 as listed by Georgeson,87 excluding contests that did not
primarily involve the election of directors upon expiration of their
terms, contests waged in connection with hostile takeover at-

87

See Georgeson, 2009 Annual Corporate Governance Review (2009), available at
www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf.
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tempts, and contests involving closed-end mutual funds.88 Our list
consists of 129 contests. In about half of these contests (66), the
dissidents obtained some board representation, either as a result of
a ballot success or pursuant to a settlement.89
Our analysis shows that most of the target companies involved in
these proxy contests are small. Only 8 companies (6%) had a market capitalization of more than $10 billion (a typical definition of
large-cap), 9 had a capitalization of between $2 billion and $10 billion (mid-cap),90 and another 40 had a capitalization of between
$300 million and $2 billion, a standard range for small-cap companies.91 About 60% of the companies (72) were micro-cap companies, with a capitalization of less than $300 million. The average
and median capitalizations of these micro-caps were $93 and $66
million. Though micro-cap companies also constitute a large fraction of publicly traded companies, they account for less than 2.5%
of the market capitalization of U.S. companies.92
That proxy contests are overwhelmingly a phenomenon of small
and very small publicly-held firms is important, but rarely noted in
the extensive literature on proxy contests. Corporate law scholars
often seem to think of publicly held firms as a unitary phenomenon
and focus mainly on the larger capitalization firms. But when a
company falls below the $300 million market cap, it is extremely
difficult to attract attention from analysts or investors.93 These
88
Contests about mergers, bylaw amendments, and director removal were excluded
because proxy access would not be a vehicle through which such contests could be
waged. Contests involving closed-end mutual funds were excluded because of the special nature of these contests, which usually relate to the opening or liquidation of a
fund.
89
In 3 contests, no election was held for reasons such as a lack of quorum or the acquisition of the company prior to the scheduled vote.
90
Mid Cap, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/midcapstock.asp
(last visited May 17, 2011).
91
Small Cap, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/small-cap.asp (last
visited May 17, 2011).
92
See Russell 3000 Index, Russell Investments (Feb. 28, 2011),
http://www.russell.com/indexes/data/fact_sheets/us/russell_3000_index.asp
(stating
that Russell 3000 companies account for 98% of the investible U.S. equities market).
93
Justin Canivet, Small Cap Analyst Coverage: An “Under-the-Radar” Dilemma,
Focus, Apr. 2009, at 4, available at www.world-exchanges.org/files/file/Focus%
200409.pdf. As Demiroglu & Ryngaert describe,
[i]n a press release dated July 7, 2005, Bob Greifeld, president and CEO of
NASDAQ, noted that 35% of all publicly traded US firms had no analyst cov-
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firms are lucky if a single analyst follows them.94 With so little attention, the market for such companies’ shares is far less informationally efficient than for mid-cap or large-cap companies.95 Similarly, micro-cap companies present distinctive governance
challenges. With most of the normal levers of accountability missing, many of them may be badly governed.
In terms of dissidents, of the 129 contests, 86 were waged by
hedge funds; of the rest, most were waged by an individual or a
group of individual investors. Mutual funds, public pension funds,
and private pension funds did not wage any of these contests. Dissidents held on average 8.9% of the target company’s outstanding
shares. In 100 of the 129 contests, the dissidents held more than 5%
of the shares of the respective target company. Only 13 dissidents
held less than 1% of the shares. This group includes 9 dissidents
that held stakes with a dollar value below $150,000, all of whom
lost. We regard such low percentage and dollar value contests as
nuisance contests. Outside of nuisance contests, there is no strong
correlation between dissident stakes and success. Thus, in the 15
contests in which dissident stakes exceeded 15%, the dissidents
won only 6 (40%), a success rate well below the sample average.
Segregating the sample into micro-cap and regular-sized (that is,
non-micro-cap) companies yields some further insights. Among
regular-sized companies, hedge funds constituted 82% of the dissi-

erage. Additionally, he cited estimates by Reuters that from January 2002 to
June 2005, 691 publicly traded US companies had lost all analysts’ coverage.
Almost all of these companies had market capitalizations under $1 billion.
Greifeld also noted “a lack of research coverage impacts company valuation, liquidity, and ultimately the welfare and growth of public companies.”
Cem Demiroglu & Michael Ryngaert, The First Analyst Coverage of Neglected
Stocks, 39 Fin. Mgmt. 555, 555 (2010) (quoting Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ
and Reuters Launch New Venture to Help Companies Obtain Independent Analyst
Coverage (June 7, 2005), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/newsroom/news/pr2005/
ne_section05_056.stm).
94
Indeed, one concern with the 2003 analyst settlement was that the new rules
would mean that many of the smaller firms would go from one analyst to zero. See
Susanne Craig, Firm to Research Stock “Orphans,” Wall St. J., June 7, 2005, at C3
(“Reuters found that since 2002, 691 companies have lost analyst coverage altogether.
The hardest hit sector: Almost 99% of the companies that have lost coverage are
smaller companies with a stock market value of less than $1 billion.”).
95
See Demiroglu & Ryngaert, supra note 93, at 555, 567–69, 581 (documenting the
price effects from the announcement of analyst coverage of a previously uncovered
company).
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dents, former insiders constituted 7%, and other dissidents constituted 11%. Among micro-caps, hedge funds accounted for only
54% of the dissidents, former insiders for 18%, and other dissidents for 28%.
Table 2: Proxy Contests 2005-2009*
Contests

Hedge
Funds

Former
Insiders

Success
Rate

Success
Rate
HF

Success
Rate
Insiders

Success
Rate
Others

All
Companies

129

86

17

52%

60%

59%

21%

Microcaps
(capitalization
< $300m)

72

39

13

51%

63%

69%

28%

Regular
(capitalization
> $300m)

57

47

4

54%

56%

25%

0%

*Derived from Georgeson, Annual Corporate Governance Review, 2005 to 2009

As Table 2 shows, the overall success rate of the dissidents was
similar in both groups. But this similarity masks important differences. Dissidents other than hedge funds had substantially higher
success rates among micro-caps than among regular-sized companies, with former insiders doing better than other non-hedge fund
dissidents. Hedge funds had high success rates in both groups, but
accounted for a much larger fraction of the contests among regular-sized companies. Dissident stakes averaged 7.8% in regular and
9.7% in micro-cap companies. In both sets of companies, former
insiders had the highest average stake (9.2% and 16.6%, respectively), followed by hedge funds (8.1% and 11%, respectively), and
other dissidents (0.2% and 7.5%, respectively).
In sum, only two types of dissidents showed meaningful success
in waging proxy contests: hedge funds and, for micro-cap companies, former insiders. Other investors—including institutional investors other than hedge funds and individual investors other than
former insiders—either never tried or rarely succeeded.
C. Contested Lite: Shareholder Proposals
Under Rule 14a-8, any shareholder who holds a mere $2,000
worth of stock for one year can place a shareholder proposal in the
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company’s proxy statement.96 Rule 14a-8 proposals may relate to
many important corporate governance matters, but they cannot be
used as a vehicle to make a nomination for a directorship.97 Given
the trivial share ownership requirements and the short holding period, especially compared to the (adopted as well as proposed)
thresholds for proxy access, a large number of shareholders are eligible to make Rule 14a-8 proposals. But most of them do not.
Georgeson publishes an annual list of all corporate governancerelated proposals submitted at S&P 1500 companies. We examined
the sponsors of the proposals for the five-year period 2005 to 2009
to determine what shareholder types make the most use of Rule
14a-8. In the 2005 to 2009 period, 1844 governance proposals were
submitted. Of these, 47% were made by individual shareholders,
39% by labor-affiliated groups (unions, union funds, and employee
organizations), and 5% by public pension funds.
Table 3: Governance Shareholder Proposal at S&P 1500*
Sponsor

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Combined

Total

375

384

375

339

371

1844

Individuals

158

180

177

163

181

859

Labor and Employee Groups

164

155

154

13

128

714

AFL-CIO

20

4

16

13

17

70

AFSCME

9

15

20

20

17

81

UBCJA
Public Pension Funds

49

64

43

20

27

203

15

19

19

19

25

97

CalPERS

3

2

5

6

5

21

NYC Pension Funds

0

9

10

10

11

40

3

7

0

3

2

15

Social Responsibility Funds

Hedge Funds

3

2

4

19

6

34

Charities and Religious Groups

24

16

15

9

13

77

Investment Managers

6

4

4

7

9

30

TIAA-CREF

0

0

0

2

4

6

*Derived from Georgeson, Annual Corporate Governance Review, 2005 to 2009

What is notable about this listing is, again, the absence of any
private pension fund and the virtual absence (with the partial ex-

96
97

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2010).
Id. § 240.14a-8(i)(8).
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ception of TIAA-CREF, which manages both retirement and mutual funds) of any mutual fund. Even public pension funds are underrepresented, and virtually all of the proposals in that category
are sponsored by a handful of funds: New York City Pension
Funds (40); CalPERS (21); Connecticut Retirement Plans (11);
Massachusetts Laborers’ Pension Fund (11); and New York State
Retirement Fund (9).
By contrast, entities with economic or ideological interests that
may deviate from maximization of company value—labor affiliated
groups, religious and other charities, and social-responsibility oriented entities—are vastly overrepresented relative to their percentage shareholdings. As to the individual sponsors, a large percentage of proposals were made by a handful of individuals (such
as John Chevedden, Gerald Armstrong, the Rossi family, and Evelyn Davis) with usually minimal ownership stakes.98
For most of these shareholder proposals, the proponent relies on
the description of the proposal but engages in no outside campaigning. Institutional shareholders are familiar with most types of
proposals and often have developed policies on how they vote on
them. Indeed, the proposals that receive majority shareholder approval tend to fall into a narrow set, which includes recommendations to destagger the board, establish majority voting, or eliminate
supermajority voting. Occasionally, shareholder sponsors may
campaign through public speeches, press releases, and advertisements, which they can do without having to make any filings.99
Very rarely, a sponsor also engages in a so-called exempt solicitation under Rule 14a-2(b), which permits a shareholder to mail materials to other shareholders without filing a proxy statement as
long as that shareholder does not furnish a proxy form and does
not seek to act as a proxy, but it requires the filing of the mailed
materials if the sponsor holds more than $5 million in shares.100
98
See, e.g., FedEx Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 85–87
(Aug. 16, 2010) (identifying shareholder John Chevedden as owner of 100 shares of
FedEx stock); Bill Barrett Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at
46–47 (Apr. 9, 2010) (identifying shareholder Gerald Armstrong as owner of 100
shares).
99
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l) (2010).
100
Id. §§ 240.14a-2(b)(1), 240.14a-6(g). In 2009, 15 shareholders engaged in such
campaigns in favor of shareholder proposals. Seven of these campaigns were led by
CalPERS. Most consisted of a single short mailing to shareholders.
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Under that rule, shareholders may also engage in oral solicitations
of other shareholders. Since most oral solicitations require no filings with the SEC,101 the exact number and scope of such solicitations are unclear. We doubt, however, that many proponents, with
the possible exception of TIAA-CREF and public pension funds,
engage in widespread oral solicitations.
D. Withhold Votes: Activism Without Activists
A final, more recent form of election “contests” relates to withhold votes in director elections. According to Georgeson’s survey
of S&P 1500 companies, there were 41 directors in 2010 who received a majority withhold vote and 317 directors who received a
withhold vote in excess of 30% of the votes cast.102 As described below,103 many boards care about the percentage of withhold votes
even if it does not affect the outcome of an election, and significant
withhold votes often induce governance changes. Withhold votes
thus represent an important form of shareholder activism.
Peculiarly, however, it is unclear who the activists behind withhold votes are. Most large withhold votes occur in companies in
which no filings were made by backers of a withhold vote.104 Thus,
most large withhold votes are cast without any open campaigning.
And, while it is true that most directors who receive large withhold
votes received a withhold vote recommendation from ISS, the
leading proxy advisor, it is equally true that most withhold recommendations by ISS do not result in large withhold votes.105 Moreover, it is unclear whether an ISS withhold recommendation is the
101
Moreover, under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b), shareholders are exempt from the
rules requiring filling, except as provided under § 240.14a-6(g):
[N]o . . . submission need be made with respect to oral solicitations (other than
with respect to scripts used in connection with such oral solicitations), speeches
delivered in a public forum, press releases, published or broadcast opinions,
statements, and advertisements appearing in a broadcast media, or a newspaper, magazine or other bona fide publication disseminated on a regular basis.
102
Georgeson, 2010 Annual Corporate Governance Review 8 (2010), available at
http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2010.pdf.
103
See infra Subsection IV.B.4.
104
In 2009, only 5 proxy statements or notices of exempt solicitations were filed in
relation to withhold votes. See Georgeson, 2009 Annual Corporate Governance Review 48–49 (2009), available at www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf.
105
See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors:
Myth or Reality?, 59 Emory L.J. 869 (2010).
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direct cause of withhold votes or whether an ISS withhold recommendation and withhold votes have the same underlying cause. A
recent paper co-authored by one of us estimates that the ISS recommendation independently shifts only 6%–10% of the shareholder vote.106 Large withhold votes may thus come about either
spontaneously or from low-level coordination among institutional
investors through oral communications and aided by recommendations by proxy advisors.
E. Who Will Use Proxy Access?
Predicting at this point what type of shareholders would use the
proxy access rule to make nominations and how frequently they
would do so is somewhat speculative. However, at least a good tentative sense of who would use proxy access can be obtained by
looking at the activists who initiated full-fledged proxy contests
and shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8. Each of these types
of activism bears some similarity to proxy access: full-fledged (or
traditional) proxy contests share with proxy access the feature that
they concern the election of directors; Rule 14a-8 proposals share
with proxy access the feature that they entail low costs unless the
proponent engages in outside campaigning.
Past participation in these forms of activism may be a predictor
of future inclination to use proxy access for several reasons. First,
proxy access may become a substitute for the other forms of activism: instead of, say, conducting a traditional proxy contest or making a shareholder proposal, a shareholder may make a nomination
using proxy access. Second, participation in these other forms of
activism indicates an interest in being and willingness to be an activist shareholder. Shareholders who, in the past, have remained
passive when it came to voting are not likely to become active
merely because—in addition to the existing avenues—a new way to
become active presents itself. Relatedly, while proxy access represents a new, relatively cheap mode of activism, which may in principle be attractive to highly cost-conscious investors, making a
Rule 14a-8 proposal is an equally cheap, and widely available,

106

Id. at 906.
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mode of activism.107 Shareholders who have not made Rule 14a-8
proposals are thus unlikely to make proxy access nominations
merely because it involves low expenses.
As discussed below,108 the third type of activism, withhold votes,
also resembles proxy access. However, since the activists behind
large withhold votes, to the extent any exist, are unknown, and
since any such activists seem to prefer to stay out of the limelight,
we cannot and probably should not look at large withhold votes to
predict who would use proxy access.
We start with proxy contests. As discussed, most (and most successful) proxy contests are initiated by hedge funds and former insiders. None were initiated by pension funds or mutual funds.109 85%
of the dissidents in these proxy contests had a stake of more than
3% of the company when the contest commenced. However, under
the rule adopted by the SEC, shareholders must also have held a 3%
stake for the prior 3 years to qualify for proxy access.
A 3-year holding period is a particular problem for hedge funds,
given their intense focus on internal rates of return. If a hedge fund
buys a $100 million stake and, within 1 year, changes things enough
to increase the share price by 20%, it has a gross annual return of
20%. If, to take advantage of the costs savings of proxy access, the
hedge fund holds the position for 3 years, earns a “normal” return of
5% in the first 3 years and then gets the same outcome with a 20%
return in the fourth, the gross annual return goes from 20% per year
to 8.6% per year. The cost savings would have to be huge to justify
the much longer holding period, far higher than is reasonable to expect. Indeed, a spot check of 12 hedge funds that initiated proxy
contests, based on 13F and other filings, showed that only 1 fund satisfied the 3-year holding period. Former insiders, by contrast, were
more likely to satisfy both the 3% threshold and the holding period.
Turning next to shareholders who submitted Rule 14a-8 proposals, the largest institutional investors, who are most likely to satisfy a
3% ownership threshold for proxy access, rarely made such submis-

107
As discussed below, a dissident shareholder has to make extensive disclosures to
become eligible for proxy access and satisfy high minimum holding period and ownership thresholds. See infra text accompanying notes 109–12 and 130–31.
108
See infra Part IV.
109
See supra Section II.B.
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sions. Rather, most proposals were submitted by individual investors
who hold trivial stakes in the respective companies.110
Labor-affiliated groups, which also frequently sponsor shareholder proposals, present a more mixed picture. Some labor groups
that have been very active in submitting shareholder proposals have
few investment assets. For example, the AFL-CIO sponsored 70
resolutions through its $28 million “Reserve Fund.”111 In comparison, a 3% stake in the median S&P 600 SmallCap company would
have a value of about $18 million. These smaller funds will thus generally hold stakes far below the threshold for proxy access.112
The real union money is in joint union-employer pension funds
subject to the Taft-Hartley Act (and thus known as “Taft-Hartley
Plans” or “THPs”). THPs face two problems in utilizing proxy access: collective action and fiduciary duties.
There are approximately 1500 THPs113 that collectively manage
approximately $400 billion in assets,114 of which approximately $100
110

See supra note 98. Similarly, charities and social issue funds appear not to have assets that are likely to be significant enough to qualify them for proxy access. For example, the Unitarian Universalist Common Endowment Fund had an ending market value
of $111.8 million as of June 30, 2010, and $21.8 million in domestic equity holdings. See
Investment Performance Summary, Unitarian Universalist Common Endowment Fund
(June 30, 2010), http://www.uua.org/documents/finance/uucef/100630_summary.pdf.
111
See Georgeson, 2009 Annual Corporate Governance Review 15 (2009), available at
www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf; see also AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO
2009 Financial Report (2009), available at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/
convention/2009/upload/ec_finreport.pdf (stating $28 million of investments by the Reserve Fund at 2008 year end).
112
In addition, a few of the social responsibility-oriented funds have assets of above $1
billion. See Press Release, The Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, The Children’s
Investment Fund Foundation Files Accounts for 2008/9 (May 28, 2010), available at
http://www.ciff.org/assets/financial/CIFF_Financial_Statement_27_May_2010.pdf (stating 2009 year-end assets of £1,445 million, equivalent to over $2 billion).
113
Private Pensions: Long-standing Challenges Remain for Multiemployer Pensions
Plans, Testimony Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 111th
Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of Charles Jeszeck, Acting Director, Education, Workforce,
and Income Security Issues, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10708t.pdf (noting that there were approximately 1500
multiemployer plans in 2009); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 2010 PBGC Annual Report
2 (2010), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2010_annual_report.pdf (“[The
PBGC] multiemployer program protects about 10.4 million works and retirees in about
1,460 pension plans.”).
114
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Pension Insurance Data Book 2009, at 105 (2010),
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2009databook.pdf (reporting total assets of
$434.9 billion at the beginning of 2007).
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billion is in common stock.115 For comparison, TIAA-CREF alone
controls approximately $420 billion. If all the assets of the activist
$40 billion United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, which sponsored 203 Rule 14a-8 proposals, were spread
proportionally over the S&P 1500 companies, the fund would only
hold about 0.35% in each company. Accordingly, with the current,
diversified asset allocation, THPs face a monstrous collective action problem in satisfying the proxy access thresholds.
Although, in principle, individual THPs or a small group could
change their investment choices to build up stakes large enough to
satisfy a 3 year/3% proxy access threshold, doing so would expose
the plans and their fiduciaries to legal risk. THPs are subject to
strict fiduciary standards under both the Taft-Hartley Act and
ERISA, including ERISA § 404(a), which mandates that fiduciaries must discharge their duties “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i)
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii)
defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”116 In addition, fiduciaries must act “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims.”117
In order to satisfy these mandates, many THPs hire outside
money managers to manage their assets and delegate full authority
to invest and vote. So long as this delegation is made prudently,
THP trustees face minimal prospects of being sued.
But suppose that, to satisfy the eligibility requirement for proxy
access, a large and active THP chose to override the investment
discretion of its outside money managers and invested an outsized
portion of its pension assets in a specific company for 3 years. In
making the investment decision, the plan fiduciaries, and anyone
else exercising discretion, would take on the fiduciary duties out115

Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Private Pension Plan Bulletin:
Abstract of 2008 Form 5500 Annual Reports 27 (2010), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008pensionplanbulletin.pdf (multiemployer pension
plans with 100 or more participants had $107,637,000,000 in common stock in 2008).
116
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
117
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
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lined above,118 and in doing so, would incur significant legal risk.
Indeed, the resulting firm-specific investment risk is significant
enough that it is considered highly unlikely that any THPs will
change their investment policies in order to qualify for proxy access.119 So long as the THPs remain widely diversified, the collective
action problems are sufficiently severe that they are unlikely to
qualify for proxy access under a 3% eligibility threshold.
By contrast, the few public funds that have sponsored more than
a handful of shareholder proposals tend to be among the largest institutional investors. The New York City Pension Funds, CalPERS,
and the New York State Retirement Fund—which, together, sponsored 70 proposals—have assets of $98 billion, $202 billion, and
$134 billion, respectively.120 Of course, only a portion of these assets
are invested in U.S. equities, and, of those, some are managed by
external managers. Thus, for example, CalPERS claims to have
voting authority only for about $30 billion of equities that are publicly traded in the U.S.121 TIAA-CREF has $415 billion in assets
118
Id. § 1002(21)(A) (“[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or
disposition of its assets . . . .”).
119
Personal communication with Damon A. Silvers, Director of Policy and Special
Counsel, AFL-CIO (Jan. 27, 2011).
120
See CalPERS, 2010 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 2 (2010) (valuing
CalPERS at $201.6 billion as of June 30, 2010); Ciara Linnane, New York Comptroller Unveils Pension Fund Reform Plan, Reuters, Feb. 18, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61H3SD20100218 (valuing New York City’s
pension fund at $98 billion); N.Y. State and Local Retirement System, 2010 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 21 (2010) (valuing pension funds at $134.2 billion as
of March 31, 2010).
121
See CalPERS, Quarterly Report Filed by Institutional Managers (Form 13F-HR)
(Jul. 22, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/919079/000114036110029935/
form13fhr.txt. On its website, CalPERS claims to have $119 billion invested in global
equities (which includes U.S. and international equities as well as alternative investments and hedge funds), and that 40% of its U.S. equities are managed externally.
See Facts at a Glance: Investments, CalPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/
about/facts/investments.pdf (last visited May 18, 2011); U.S. Equities, CalPERS (Nov.
15,
2010),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/assets/equities/
usequities.xml. The discrepancy between these figures is likely due to the fact that
outside money managers exercise voting authority over a portion of the CalPERS equity investments. The rule is not entirely clear as to whether shareholders like
CalPERS can use all their shares in a company to meet the eligibility requirements
even if some of these shares are managed by an outside money manager who has voting authority. The key is whether CalPERS has the “power” to vote the shares. If
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under management122 and voting authority for over $92 billion of
equities that are publicly traded in the U.S.123 Given their substantial asset size, the larger public pension funds and especially TIAACREF may well qualify for proxy access for several of their portfolio companies outright. As large institutional investors, these entities are also relatively well positioned to assemble a group of
shareholders that so qualifies.
Of course, even these large institutional investors will not necessarily own the requisite shares in the specific company for which
they would want to use proxy access. Thus, for example, CalPERS
held between 0.4% and 1.3% of the shares in the 6 S&P 1500 companies to which it submitted a shareholder proposal in 2008.124 In
CalPERS can at any time revoke the delegation of voting authority, one could argue
that it either does have such authority already or that it could easily amend its contracts prospectively to give it the power, when it chooses, to vote shares held on its
behalf by outside money managers. The practicability of such contracts may depend
on the type of outside money manager that CalPERS employs. To the extent that equity is held via mutual funds or hedge funds, rather than in managed accounts, it may
be difficult for CalPERS to obtain the requisite voting power.
122
TIAA CREF, 2009 Annual Report 2 (2009), available at http://www.tiaacref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_tcp/documents/document/tiaa04018030.pdf.
123
TIAA CREF Investment Management, LLC, Quarterly Report Filed By Institutional Managers (Form 13F-HR) (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/887793/000088779310000005/r30-0630.txt.
124
CalPERS owned 0.4% of Dollar Tree. See Dollar Tree, Definitive Additional
Materials (Form DEFA 14A), at 2 (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/935703/000093570308000057/a.htm; California Public Employees
Retirement System, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX 14A6G), at 1 (May 29,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/919079/000119380508
001433/e603890_px14a6g-dollar.htm. CalPERS owned 1.3% of Tech Data Corporation. See CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G), at 1 (May 15,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/790703/000118811
208001684/t62731_px14a6g.htm. CalPERS owned 0.7% of Interpublic Group. See Interpublic Group, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 2 (Apr. 18, 2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51644/000104746908004848/
a2184688zdef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX 14A6G), at
1 (Apr. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51644/
000118811208001447/t62529_px14a6g.htm. CalPERS owned 0.4% of Hilb Rogal &
Hobbs. See Hilb Rogal & Hobbs, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 1
(Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814898/00011931
2508070921/ddef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX
14A6G), at 1 (Apr. 23, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
814898/000091907908000007/hrh_filing.htm. CalPERS owned 0.5% of Standard Pacific. See Standard Pacific Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 1
(Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/878560/
000119312508072676/ddef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form
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the 3 companies for which CalPERS made an exempt solicitation
in support of a shareholder proposal in 2010, it held, respectively,
0.2%, 0.4%, and 0.6% of the shares.125 TIAA-CREF held slightly
above 1% of the shares in the two companies in which it made
proposals in 2008.126 Presumably, the number of shares in these
companies that has been held for the requisite 3-year period is
even lower, perhaps substantially so. And the holdings of CalPERS
are of a magnitude that suggests that even a group of several large
public pension funds may not satisfy a 3% ownership threshold for
a given company. Finally, both the large pension funds and, even
more so, TIAA-CREF have been relatively restrained in offering
shareholder resolutions under Rule 14a-8. In 2010, for example,
TIAA-CREF did not make a single Rule14a-8 shareholder proposal in an S&P 1500 company, even though it would have been
qualified to do so for most if not all of the companies in the index.

PX 14A6G), at 1 (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/878560/000117152008000224/eps2936.htm. CalPERS owned 0.4% of Eli Lilly &
Co. See Eli Lilly & Co, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 3 (Mar. 10,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59478/000095013
708003475/c22930ddef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX
14A6G), at 1 (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
59478/000119380508000951/e603562_pxa146g-calpers.htm.
125
CalPERS owned 0.2% of Health Net. See Health Net, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 5 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/916085/000119312510088007/ddef14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt
Solicitation (Form PX14A6G), at 1 (May 3, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/916085/000117152010000282/eps3791.htm. CalPERS owned
0.4% of Graco. See Graco, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 6
(2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/42888/000095012
310023365/c56457ddef14a.htm; CalPERS (Form PX14A6G), at 1 (Mar. 30, 2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/42888/000117152010000236/
eps3761.htm. CalPERS owned 0.6% of Hospitality Properties Trust. See Hospitality
Properties Trust, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 5 (2010), available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/945394/000104746910001257/a2196573z
def14a.htm; CalPERS, Notice of Exempt Solicitation (Form PX14A6G), at 1 (Mar.
25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/919079/0001171
52010000222/eps3755.htm.
126
See Johnson & Johnson, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 2, 58
(Mar. 12, 2008), available at http://google.brand.edgar-online.com/DisplayFiling.aspx?
TabIndex=2&FilingID=5794786&companyid=10313&ppu=%252fdefault.aspx
%253fcompanyid%253d10313%2526amp%253bformtypeId%253d148 (Johnson &
Johnson, 1%); PepsiCo, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 1, 49 (Mar.
24, 2008), available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/pepsico-inc/def-14a-proxystatement-definitive/2008/03/24/section2.aspx (PepsiCo, 1.4%).

KAHANROCK_BOOK

1382

9/15/20117:46 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 97:1347

This, of course, raises substantial doubt about their proclivity to
make proxy access nominations. Still, on occasion, these investors
may both have an interest in becoming active in a company and either meet the qualifications for proxy access for that company or
be able to assemble a group of investors that does.
In sum, judging from their past actions, the set of shareholders
that have shown both an interest in activism and have some potential to be eligible for proxy access is fairly limited. Select public
pension funds and, to a lesser extent, TIAA-CREF, have shown a
modest interest in activism and may qualify for proxy access for
some of their portfolio companies. Labor affiliated groups have
shown a more significant interest in activism, but would be less
likely to qualify due to the percentage ownership requirement.
Hedge funds have been active in full-fledged contests, but would
usually not satisfy a 3-year holding period. Former insiders may
satisfy both the ownership threshold and the holding period requirement for micro-cap companies (albeit generally not for larger
companies).
Of course, if the SEC releases a revised rule on proxy access in
an effort to cure the deficiencies noted in the Court of Appeals, it
may adopt different eligibility thresholds. We would anticipate that
such thresholds would make eligibility more restrictive than the
2010 rules. But even if the SEC decided to relax the eligibility
standard and revert to the 1%/1-year standard applicable to larger
accelerated filers under its 2009 proposal, the general thrust of our
argument would remain: most large institutional investors have
shown no interest in or inclination to types of activism similar to
proxy access; and labor affiliated groups, which have shown themselves most interested in activism, would often fail to satisfy even a
1% threshold.
A remaining possibility is that some new player would emerge or
an existing player would become a catalyst to organize the longer
term shareholders such as mutual funds into a group large enough
to meet the threshold for taking advantage of proxy access, similar
to the way hedge funds have played a catalyst role in other areas of
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corporate governance and corporate control.127 For reasons we discuss below,128 we think this is unlikely.
Interest in activism and qualification for proxy access, of course,
is just the beginning of the inquiry. The next steps are to determine
whether it would make sense for these shareholders to pursue
proxy access, as opposed to either a traditional proxy contest or a
withhold campaign, and whether, if they were to pursue proxy access, they would have a significant chance of succeeding. These issues are taken up in the following Parts.
III. PROXY ACCESS VERSUS TRADITIONAL PROXY CONTESTS
In examining the impact of proxy access, one has to compare
proxy access to the existing alternatives for shareholder activism to
see what advantages it offers and what disadvantages it entails. The
closest alternatives to proxy access are either the waging of a traditional proxy contest—in which a dissident submits its own proxy
statement—or to withhold the vote for company nominees. In this
Part, we will compare proxy access to a traditional proxy contest.
In the next Part, we will compare it to withholding one’s vote.
Before we commence our substantive discussion, we want to
clarify the terminology we will be using. We will use the terms “dissident” and “dissident shareholder” to refer to the party who initiates (and pays for) a campaign and the terms “dissident nominee”
and “company nominee” to refer to the persons running for seats
on the board of directors nominated by the dissident or the board,
respectively. We will use the terms “traditional proxy contest” and
“proxy access contest” to distinguish between election contests in
which the dissident, respectively, does not or does make use of
proxy access. Finally, we will use the terms “withhold” or “just say
no” campaign to refer to elections in which there is a large percentage of withhold votes, even if there is little or no observable
campaigning.

127
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1045 (2007).
128
See infra Section IV.D.

KAHANROCK_BOOK

1384

9/15/20117:46 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 97:1347

A. Plusses of Proxy Access: Cost Savings
The principal direct effect of proxy access is to reduce the costs
of conducting a contested election. This is achieved by forcing
companies to include, under certain circumstances, shareholder
nominees in the company’s proxy statement. In this Section, we
will discuss how significant these cost savings are. For purposes of
this analysis, we will take as a starting point the costs of a traditional proxy contest and then analyze the extent to which these
costs decline as a result of proxy access. As background, it is worth
recalling the wide range of cost estimates for contested solicitations, from about $30,000 to approximately $9 million.129
1. Cost of Preparing a Proxy Statement That Complies with
Schedule 14A
Proxy access obviously has the result of removing the requirement for a dissident to prepare her own proxy statement. Instead,
however, under the rule adopted by the SEC, a dissident would
have to prepare and submit to the company a newly established
Schedule 14N.130 But as we show, the net cost savings from having
to prepare a Schedule 14N instead of a proxy statement are minimal.
The actual content of proxy statements can roughly be divided
into 4 parts: required substantive information about the dissident
and her nominees, certain technical information that identifies the
issues and explains the basic ground rules, disclosures related to
the company that duplicates the information provided by the company in its proxy statement, and additional information not required by the proxy rules.
Table 4 below contains our analysis of Schedule 14A, which governs the required contents of proxy statements. As to each item or
sub-item, we categorized the information required as substantive,
technical, or unnecessarily duplicative. Items that do not relate to
the election of directors, or only to uncontested elections, or that
generally require disclosure only by the company, are omitted.
129

See supra Table 1.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-1 (2010). We believe that any revised rule would contain
equivalent requirements. Otherwise, shareholders would have less information about
dissidents and their nominees in proxy access contests than in regular contests.
130
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Table 4: Schedule 14A Items
Item

Description

Category

14N

1a, b

Date, time, place of meeting; registrant’s address;
mailing date

Technical

1c

Deadline for stockholder proposals for following
year

Duplicative

2

Proxy revocability

Technical

4b

Solicitation methods, use of employees, contracts
with other solicitation agents, total costs and costs
to date, who pays/reimbursement, terms of any settlement

Substantive

Yes

5b

Interest and security holdings of any participant;
name, address, convictions, share transactions in
prior 2 years, source of funds, contracts re securities; ownership, related transactions, future employment or transactions by associates of participants

Substantive

Yes

6a–c

Share info: outstanding, votes, record date, cumulative voting

Technical

6d

Ownership by management and 5% holders

Duplicative

6e

Information regarding change of control

Duplicative

7b

Only re nominees: bio, related transactions, 16(a)

Substantive

Yes

7c

Only re nominees: independence

Substantive

Yes

10–
20

Other items

Duplicative

21

Voting: required vote, abstentions and broker nonvotes

Technical

23

Documents where security holders share address

Technical

Substantive information includes biographical information about
the nominees, information about other “participants” (for example, the dissident entity) and their interest in the solicitation, and
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information about solicitation methods and expenses. Unlike technical and duplicative information, substantive information must be
prepared from scratch by the dissident. Moreover, the information
that must be disclosed, in particular with respect to items 5 and 7,
can be extensive. The preparation of substantive information,
therefore, entails the greatest regulatory compliance costs. The
proxy access rule would do nothing to reduce these costs, however,
since a dissident and her nominees must provide the same substantive information to the SEC and to the company on a newly created Schedule 14N.131
Technical information includes the name and address of the
company, time and place of the annual meeting, information on
how to vote, the record date, the effect of abstentions and broker
no-votes, proxy revocability, the required vote, the number of
shares outstanding, and some additional disclosure where one set
of materials is sent to holders who share an address. Proxy access
would save the costs associated with including this information in a
proxy statement. But because technical information is of limited
scope and basically copied from the company’s proxy statement,
these cost savings would be trivial.
Duplicative information includes information about shareholdings by 5% owners and by management, information about any issue for which the dissident does not engage in a countersolicitation, as well as information as to whether a change of control has occurred and by what deadline shareholder proposals must
be submitted for the annual meeting in the following year. Since all
of this information is already included in the company’s proxy
statement, and as long as dissidents do not have private information indicating that the information provided by the company is incorrect, it is not clear why the SEC requires the disclosure of this
duplicative information.132 But since duplicative information can be
131

Id. § 240.14n-101.
As to agenda items other than the election of directors, as long as dissidents make
no recommendation about how to vote or the same recommendation as the company,
they also should be permitted to refer to the company’s proxy statement for further
information on these items. To be sure, this would mean that shareholders have to
access the company’s proxy statement to get such information. But the same is true
whenever a company uses notice and access, where shareholders are given a voting
form and told where they can get additional information on the item at issue. As to
the other items, the SEC should not require their disclosure in dissident proxy state132
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copied from the company’s proxy statement, the regulatory compliance burden is minimal.
A significant portion of the proxy statement is taken up by information that is not required by SEC rules.133 Such information is
usually intended to influence shareholder votes. As such, it resembles other campaign expenses. Campaign information included in a
proxy statement often consists of additional information about the
dissident and her nominees,134 the reasons for the solicitations,135
and any business strategies that the dissident would want the company to explore;136 the address of the proxy solicitor who can provide further information and assistance in voting;137 and several
boldfaced recommendations on how to vote.138 Obviously, since
these information items are provided voluntarily and serve a campaigning rather than a regulatory compliance function, proxy access does not result in any cost savings as to these items.
In sum then, the proxy access rule only reduces the costs associated with the preparation of a proxy statement that satisfies the
regulatory requirements by eliminating the costs associated with
the preparation of duplicative and technical information. As to
substantive and campaign information, the dissident must either
prepare a statement containing the same information even under
proxy access or it does not have to provide the information to start
with. The technical and duplicative information spans only a few
pages and is copied from the company’s proxy statement. The resulting cost savings will therefore be minimal.

ments (as it did, for example, for information in Item 8 of Regulation 14A) unless the
dissident has access to information not available to the company which indicates that
the information in the company’s proxy statement is incorrect.
133
See, e.g., Metropolitan Capital Advisors, Definitive Proxy Statement Filed by
Non-Registrant (Form DEFN 14A), at 3–10 (Jan. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Metropolitan
Proxy Statement], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864683/
000119312507001082/ddefn14a.htm.
134
See id. at 10–11.
135
See id. at 4–10.
136
See Trian Fund Management, Definitive Additional Proxy Materials Filed by
Non-Registrant (Form DFAN 14A) (May 23, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/46640/000095011706002372/ex1.htm (showing dissident Trian
Group offering new business strategies for H.J. Heinz Company).
137
See Metropolitan Proxy Statement, supra note 133, at 3.
138
See id. at 3, 12.
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2. Cost of Distributing the Proxy Statement to All Solicited
Shareholders
Proxy access also eliminates the requirement for dissidents to
distribute the proxy statement to all solicited shareholders. As a result, nominations under proxy access will save the costs of printing,
mailing and distributing the proxy statement.
Printing and mailing expenses for a proxy statement depend on
the length of the statement and the number of shareholders that
are being solicited. A dissident proxy statement that contains only
the required disclosures would typically be 10–15 pages long.
Printing and mailing expenses are further reduced in two ways.
First, many shareholders do not receive printed proxy statements,
either because they have signed up for internet delivery, because
they participate in ProxyEdge (an electronic delivery system for institutional shareholders set up by Broadridge), or because a single
statement is sent to a financial advisor for a managed account or to
a household with multiple shareholders. In uncontested 2010 elections, these “suppressed” accounts total about 54% of all distributed proxy statements, and their percentage has been rising.139 As
to suppressed mailings, dissidents have no printing and mailing expenses, and instead just pay an incentive fee of 25 or 50 cents per
account, depending on the size of the distribution.140
Second, the proxy rules do not require a dissident to provide a
proxy statement to each shareholder. A dissident could, if it opted
to do so, forego soliciting small shareholders and not send them a
proxy statement either.141 Data compiled by Broadridge suggest
139
See Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., 2010 Proxy Season: Key Statistics &
Performance Ratings 2 (2010) [hereinafter Key Statistics], available at
http://www.broadridge.com/investor-communications/us/Broadridge_Proxy_
Stats_2010.pdf (54.4% suppression in 2010); Compass Lexecon, An Analysis of Beneficial Proxy Delivery Services 14 (May 11, 2010) [hereinafter Beneficial Proxy Delivery Services], available at http://www.broadridgeinfo.com/ADPFiles/Compass%
20Lexecon%20Report%20Final%2005-14-10.pdf (showing steadily increasing suppression percentages from 7.7% in 1998 to 53.2% in 2009).
140
NYSE Rule 465, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2465 (June 2010).
141
The recently enacted rules on internet availability of proxy materials offer dissidents another option. Under these rules, a dissident does not have to mail paper
proxy statements to shareholders as long as they provide shareholders with a short
(typically half-page) notice at least 10 days before a proxy form or other solicitation
materials are sent to shareholders regarding the internet availability of the information, post the proxy statement on a website, and supply paper and email copies on re-
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that accounts containing fewer than 1000 shares constitute about
90% of all accounts, but that the shares in these accounts constitute
only 3.7% of the votes cast.142 Moreover, over half of the shares
voted that are held in such small accounts are voted through
ProxyEdge, an electronic system established by Broadridge for institutional investors and investment advisors that permits the voting of shares held in different accounts on a consolidated basis.143
ProxyEdge enables an investor or advisor to vote shares held in all
accounts, whether or not the holder received a proxy statement for
any particular account, at least as long as that holder also has
shares in a different account for which it received a proxy statement. As a result, printing and mailing expenses can be dramatically reduced, with a minimal impact on the voting outcome, by not
mailing proxy statements to holders of small accounts.
In addition to printing and mailing expenses, any person who
distributes a proxy statement (or another mailing) to beneficial
owners has to pay a unit fee to the securities intermediary through
which the shares are held. In a contested election, this fee is $1 for
the mailing of the proxy statement.144 The unit fee is payable for accounts that receive hard copies of the proxy statement as well as
for suppressed accounts, but is not payable for accounts that are
excluded from a distribution (for example, because the number of
shares held in the account is too small).

quest. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2010). Typically, less than 5% of the shareholders request paper copies. Personal communication with Charles V. Callan, Chief Regulatory Officer, Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Oct. 25, 2010). Thus, notice and
access reduce the costs for printing and mailing the proxy statement. Notice and access, however, require the dissident to make one mailing (of the notice) without any
campaign literature and impose a 10-day delay for the distribution of campaign materials. For that reason, most dissidents do not avail themselves of notice and access.
142
See Key Statistics, supra note 139, at 3 (providing 3.7% of votes cast figure). That
such small accounts constitute about 90% of all accounts is our estimate derived from
the data on ballot share amounts and total shares processed in the Key Statistics and
estimates of the total number of accounts derived from these statistics.
143
Id.
144
NYSE Rule 465, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2465 (June 2010). It is somewhat
ironic that the largest expense component obviated by proxy access is a fee imposed
by New York Stock Exchange Rules and sanctioned by the SEC. Much of the effect
of proxy access thus could have been achieved by merely lowering this fee.
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3. Costs of Collecting and Processing Votes
A third saving associated with proxy access relates to the costs of
mailing separate proxy forms to shareholders and the costs of return postage and of processing the returned forms. In a traditional
proxy contest, both the company and a dissident prepare their own
proxy forms and forms of voting instructions. Proxy forms are sent
to shareholders who are also listed as record holders in the company’s register. These proxy forms are then typically returned to,
respectively, the company’s or the dissident’s proxy solicitor. For
shareholders who hold their shares through brokers and banks,
Broadridge distributes voting instruction forms which are then returned to Broadridge, tabulated, and presented to the company’s
vote tabulator.145 Under proxy access, however, there is only one
form of proxy and one form of voting instructions that contains
both the company’s and the dissident’s nominees. These forms are
distributed to shareholders at the company’s expense and, if
mailed, returned at the company’s expense. The dissident pays
nothing.
In traditional proxy contests, the proxy statement and the voting
forms are mailed out together. Compared to traditional contests,
proxy access thus generates savings for the printing costs of voting
forms and the costs associated with the return of the voting forms.
In traditional contests, the latter costs obviously arise only (and the
cost savings generated by proxy access thus extend only) with respect to the portion of the dissident’s forms that are used to cast
votes for the dissident.
4. Campaign Expenses, Including Associated Legal and
Regulatory Expenses
Campaign expenses are, in most contests, by far the largest expense item. They include all campaign materials and information
provided to shareholders that go beyond the required disclosures
made in the proxy statement. While the proxy statement serves
also as a regulatory compliance document with a lot of fine print,
the other mailings to shareholders (so-called “fight letters”) tend to
be more catchy and reader friendly and to focus on the issues and

145

Shareholders are also given the option to vote by phone or via the internet.
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information likely to influence shareholders, rather than on disclosures required by the SEC.146 In addition to drafting and sending
fight letters, solicitors make personal phone calls to record holders,
beneficial holders who have not objected to the disclosure of their
names (so-called NOBOs), and other institutions who are known
(as a result of their public filings or industry rumors) to hold shares
in the company. For larger holders and proxy advisors, dissidents
sometimes make detailed presentations of their future strategic
plans for the company and the benefits they expect to reap. Other
campaign expenses include the cost of strategic advice provided by
proxy solicitors, the cost of legal advice related to campaign materials (for example, review of these materials for compliance with
the anti-fraud rules), and litigation expenses concerning these materials. Proxy access has virtually no impact on these cost items and
any associated legal and regulatory expenses. Even under proxy
access, to the extent that a dissident engages in any such campaigning, all these expenses must still be borne by the dissident.
The only exception is that the dissident may include a supporting
statement of up to 500 words in the company’s proxy statement.147
While the dissident bears the cost of preparing that statement, the
costs of distributing it fall on the company. For a dissident who
does not otherwise campaign, the supporting statement is the only
campaign material that is provided to shareholders and the dissident is limited to the 500-word statement in explaining why shareholders should vote for the dissident nominee instead of a company nominee.
We doubt, however, that this supporting statement will be effective. First, a 500-word statement is very short to make both the
negative case that the management nominees should not all be reelected and the affirmative case that the dissident nominee deserves election instead. While a 500-word statement in support of a
shareholder proposal can be enough to identify a proposal as one
of a standard type (for example, to declassify the board), director
elections are a much more complex decision. Second, many share146
See, e.g., The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders, Definitive Additional Proxy Materials Filed by Non-Registrant (Form DFAN 14A) (Jan. 12,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864683/00011931250700
5900/ddfan14a.htm.
147
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(c) (2010).
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holders may never read the dissident’s supporting statement. Company proxy statements are significantly longer than dissident proxy
statements because of additional disclosure requirements imposed
only on the company.148 The company can thus easily bury the supporting statement somewhere in the long compliance document
where it is unlikely to be noticed even by shareholders who receive
a paper copy. Moreover, the company can use “notice and access”
for distributing its proxy statement.149 Under notice and access, the
company mails a short notice to shareholders informing them how
to receive a paper or electronic copy of the proxy statement.150
Shareholders who do nothing thus never receive a copy of the
proxy statement. But, while the proxy statement itself is mailed out
only on request, the company can distribute its own fight letters,
which will not contain the dissident’s supporting statement, to all
shareholders. For dissidents who do not otherwise campaign, this
means that many shareholders will never read the supporting
statement, though they may receive plenty of campaign materials
from the company.
5. Assessment of Aggregate Cost Savings
Data on distribution size, total solicitation costs, and printing
and postage expenses compiled by the former parent company of
Broadridge for proxy contests from 2003 to 2005 enable us to
evaluate the aggregate cost savings that would have been generated in these contests if the dissident had used proxy access.151 We

148

See, e.g., Id. § 240.14a-101, Items 8 and 9.
Id. § 240.14a-16; Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet Availability of Proxy
Materials, Securities Act Release No. 9108, Exchange Act Release No. 61,560, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,131, 75 Fed. Reg. 9073 (Feb. 26, 2010), reprinted in [2009-2010 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,866, at 84,708
(Feb. 22, 2010); Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials, Exchange Act Release No. 56,135, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,911, 72 Fed. Reg. 422,221
(Aug. 1, 2007).
150
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-16 (2010); Shareholder Choice Regarding Proxy Materials,
Exchange Act Release No. 56,135, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,911, 72
Fed. Reg. 422,221 (Aug. 1, 2007). In addition, the Commission has adopted the notice-and-access model that permits issuers to send shareholders a Notice of Internet
Availability of Proxy Materials in lieu of the traditional paper packages.
151
These data are contained in a letter from Richard J. Daly, Group Co-President,
Automatic Data Processing, Inc., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
149
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used these data as input to a regression to estimate both the total
solicitation expenses and the printing and postage expenses associated with the mailing of the proxy statement as a function of the
size of the initial distribution and of any subsequent fight letters,152
and calculated total cost savings as the sum of the saved printing
and mailing costs, the $1 unit fee per account, and an additional estimate of $0.50 per account for the costs associated with the printing and collection of voting forms and other expenses. Reflecting
the fact that many companies involved in proxy contests are small
and that dissidents decide not to mail statements to shareholders
who hold few shares, the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of the actual distribution sizes were, respectively, about 1,600;
2,500; and 5,600. The largest distribution was made to 203,000
shareholders and the second largest to 32,000.
In dollar terms, the estimated cost savings for the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile distributions amounted to $7,000;
$9,800; and $17,700, respectively.153 Even for significantly larger distribution sizes of 20,000 and 50,000, the estimated cost savings are
modest, $47,000 and $100,000, respectively. In percentage terms,
the cost savings for the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile
distributions account for 3.4%, 4.3%, and 5.8%, respectively, of solicitation expense estimates provided by dissidents in their proxy
statements. For distributions above 10,000, percentage cost savings
stabilize at around 6.6%.
Comm’n (Apr. 20, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71005/
ccallan1565.pdf.
152
We removed one outlier in running this regression.
153
These cost measures are not adjusted for inflation. Nevertheless, we believe that
they reflect an overestimate of actual cost savings for several reasons. First, the percentage of suppressed accounts that do not receive hard copies of the proxy statement
increased from 32.4% to 40.9% in the years 2003–2005 to 54.4% for 2010. See Key
Statistics, supra note 139, at 1; Beneficial Proxy Delivery Services, supra note 139, at
14. Second, we believe that our allowance of $0.50 for the costs associated with voting
is conservative, especially for larger contests and in light of the fact that only 82% of
the shares are voted through ProxyEdge and 10% through the internet. See Key Statistics, supra note 139, at 3. Third, the Broadridge estimate concerned the cost of
printing and mailing the actual proxy statements used by the dissident, rather than a
minimal statement containing only the required disclosures and a 500-word supporting statement. Fourth, one large cost item, the unit fee payable to intermediaries, is
based on 2010 cost levels. Note that the issuer’s printing and mailing expenses are
substantially higher since issuers often mail glossy (both expensive to print and to
mail) annual reports to shareholders with their proxy statements.
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B. Minuses of Proxy Access
1. Limitations on Nominees
In traditional contests, dissidents can make as many nominations
as there are board seats up for election. For companies without a
staggered board, this means that they can run nominees for the entire board and take over control in one proxy contest. In companies with staggered boards, this typically means that they can run
nominees for the one-third of the board up for election each year.
Under proxy access, the number of nominees would be more
confined. Only one shareholder dissident may use proxy access for
any given election, and that shareholder may nominate directors
for no more than 25% of the board seats.154 Thus, for example, if
the board has 7 members, the dissident may nominate one candidate; if the board has 12 members, the dissident may nominate up
to 3 candidates. Any previously elected dissident candidates who
remain on the board count towards that maximum.155
The limitations imposed by the proxy access rule would clearly
be problematic for any dissident who, but for these limitations,
would have wanted to nominate candidates for more than 25% of
the board seats. Such a dissident may therefore prefer to run a traditional contest instead of a proxy access contest.
In our sample of contested elections, dissidents in 59% of the
contests involving former insiders sought board control156 and, in
another 29% sought more than the 25% of the seats obtainable via
proxy access. Particularly for former insiders, proxy access would
probably not be a useful alternative to a full-fledged proxy contest.
But many dissidents run so-called “short slate” contests. In short
slate contests, the dissident nominates fewer candidates than there
are seats up for election and fills the remaining spots with company
nominees. By definition, in short slate contests, a dissident does not
nominate the maximum number of candidates possible. Short slate
154

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(d) (2010).
Id. § 240.14a-11(d)(2).
We characterized dissidents as seeking board control if they contested more than
a majority of the board seats. Hedge funds sought control in only 17% of the contests.
For companies with staggered boards, even a dissident who contests all the board
seats up for election will usually contest less than a majority of the seats. If such contests are redefined as control contests, the percentage of former insiders seeking control rises to 76%.
155
156
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contests are often run by hedge funds that seek board representation but, intentionally, do not seek board control. Even though
short slate contests sometimes involve more than 25% of the seats,
the limitation on the number of candidates would seem to be less
severe for short slate contests than for other contests.
However, even for short slate contests, and even for the subset
of short slate contests involving no more than 25% of the seats, the
limitation on nominees is significant. While a dissident in a short
slate contest does not seek immediate control, the power of any
elected dissident nominees depends on the future threat of a control contest. As discussed below,157 minority representation on the
board not coupled with such a threat may not amount to much.
The minority can always be outvoted and even shut-out completely
from the decision-making process by the delegation of decisionmaking power to board committees on which the minority is not
represented. The power of a minority board member depends on
her ability to persuade other directors and on the ability of the dissident to take over control if the majority is recalcitrant.
In a typical short slate contest in which dissident nominees are
elected, the dissident has shown her ability to mount a successful
contest and the shareholders have indicated that they want the dissident nominees’ views to be taken into account. A majority that
ignores the dissident acts at its peril.
In a proxy access contest, the situation is less stark. To be sure,
the shareholders have shown support for the dissident. But the dissident cannot obtain board control via proxy access. The dissident
may try to gain control through a traditional proxy contest in the
year following the proxy access contest. But the threat of doing so
would be undermined by the requirement in the proxy access rule
that a dissident not have the purpose of changing control or gaining
more board seats than the 25% threshold available via proxy access.158 A dissident who, at the time of a proxy access nomination,
claimed not to seek control and made nominations for less than
25% of the board and then, a year later, changed her tune arguing
that her intentions had changed because the board majority ig-

157
158

See infra Section IV.A.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(b)(6) (2010).
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nored the dissident nominees’ views would run significant litigation
risk.
Even if this obstacle is overcome, the mere fact that a dissident
used proxy access would make the threat of running a traditional
proxy contest in the following year less credible. By using proxy
access, a dissident signals that she is highly cost-conscious and willing, as we will show below,159 to accept a significantly lower chance
of winning in exchange for a small reduction in proxy contest expenditures. This is not a message of shock and awe and is much less
likely than a successful short slate contest to induce cooperation by
the majority.
2. Higher Voting Threshold
The practical effect of proxy access, and the way it is likely to be
implemented, will raise the level of shareholder support that is required for dissident nominees to succeed. To see this effect, we
have to delve deeper into the board election system and the design
of voting forms. In contested board elections, the candidates with
the most votes fill the available seats. Moreover, shareholders
normally can vote for as many candidates as there are seats to be
filled.160
In traditional contests, it generally takes the support of a majority of the shares that are voted to get a dissident nominee elected.
In these contests, both sides—the company and the dissident—
distribute separate voting forms listing the respective sides’ nominees. In traditional short slate contests, the dissident completes the
slate by listing specific company nominees in addition to the dissident nominees.161 While a shareholder may decide not to vote for
all of the dissident’s or for all of the company’s nominees listed on
the respective form, it is very difficult for a shareholder to vote for
some of the dissident’s nominees and some of the company’s
nominees not listed on the dissident form.162 Given this design of
159

See infra Subsections III.B.2–6.
We focus here on elections without cumulative voting. Cumulative voting is addressed infra Subsection III.B.5.
161
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(4) (2010).
162
To do that, the shareholder would have to show up in person at the meeting and,
if the shareholder were not a record holder, would in addition have to get a proxy
from the record holder before the meeting.
160
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the voting forms, most shareholders vote either for all the company
nominees or for all the dissident nominees (including, in a short
slate contest, the company nominees listed on the dissident’s proxy
form). Some shareholders vote for a subset of the respective nominees. But, we believe, it is extremely rare for shareholders to split
their votes. In this structure, if holders of a majority of voted
shares—and occasionally even fewer—support a dissident nominee, the nominee will get elected.
By contrast, under proxy access, it may take substantially more
votes to be elected. The reason is that both the dissident and the
company nominees appear on a single ballot form. Consider a hypothetical election with 7 candidates for 5 seats to the board of a
company with 1 million voting shares. The table below gives the
votes received by each nominee. Even though Fred received the
votes of holders of 69% of the voting shares, he is not elected.
Nominee
Alice
Bill
Claire
David
Emily
Fred
Gillian

Votes
790,000
770,000
750,000
730,000
710,000
690,000
560,000

Total

5,000,000

The difference in required votes between traditional contests
and proxy access contests is due to the fact that, in traditional contests, shareholders cannot split their votes between dissident nominees and those company nominees that do not appear on the dissident ballot. In traditional short slate contests, the company
nominee who is also named on the dissident ballot is virtually assured election. From the dissident’s perspective, votes for this
company nominee are harmless. The dissident only cares about the
votes received by its nominees and by the company nominees who
do not appear on the dissident’s ballot, and the ballot design assures that supporters of the dissident do not vote for those nomi-
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nees. In effect, the ballot design enables the dissident to coordinate
the votes by its supporters and to assure that they do not cast any
votes for the “wrong” company nominee. Under proxy access, a
single voting form does not afford such coordination. Shareholders
can vote for a dissident nominee and any company nominee and
may not even know which company nominee the dissident is trying
to defeat.163 The likely result is that many shareholders who vote
for dissident nominees will spread their remaining votes among different company nominees.
To see the effect of this feature of proxy access on the required
vote, take the extreme case in which all shareholders vote for the
maximum permissible number of nominees and in which shareholders who support the dissident vote for all dissident nominees
and distribute their remaining votes evenly among the company
nominees. Let S be the number of board seats up for election and
V be the number of dissident nominees. To get elected, a dissident
nominee must receive a fraction of votes d > S/(S+V). The reason
is that each company nominee will get the vote of the fraction (1-d)
of the shares that did not support the dissident, and, in addition, a
fraction equal to d*(S-V)/S from supporters of the dissident who
distribute their remaining votes (S-V) evenly among the S company
nominees.
If a dissident makes nominations for all open seats (if V=S), it
just takes the support of more than half of the voting shares to get
the dissident nominees election. However, as the proxy access rule
limits the number of nominees to 25% of the board, most proxy access contests would be for less than all of the open seats. If the
whole board is up for election, V would be at most (S/4), and the
support required to get elected would be 80% of the voting shares
(or more if the number of open board seats is not divisible by 4).
For companies with a staggered board and classes of equal size, V
would be at most (3S/4), and the support required to get elected
would be 57% (or more if the number of open board seats is not
163

The 500-word limit on the supporting statement and the fact that it may not be
read by all shareholders make it a rather ineffective vehicle for effecting such coordination. To be sure, to the extent that a dissident engages in additional campaigning, it
can ask shareholders not to vote for specific (or any) company nominees. But the fact
that such targeting is not automatically induced by the design of the voting forms is
likely to make it much less effective.
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divisible by 4). Most such staggered boards have 9 members, in
which case the required support threshold would be 60%.
Admittedly, the assumptions we used to make these calculations
represent an extreme case. Some dissident supporters may cast
votes only in favor of the dissident nominees, even though they
have additional votes they are permitted to cast. To the extent that
dissident supporters also cast votes for board nominees, they may
not do so evenly but rather based on factors such as the description
of the board nominee in the proxy statement, the order in which
the nominees are listed, or voting recommendations received by a
proxy advisor. Thus, in reality, the effect of the ballot design under
proxy access will be less strong than as presented in our calculations.
3. Design of the Proxy Card
Under proxy access, the single ballot forms sent to shareholders
are prepared by the company. This, by itself, entails significant advantages for the company and disadvantages for the dissident.
First, the adopting release for the proxy access rule makes clear
that the company is permitted to note on these forms that it recommends that shareholders vote for its nominees and against the
dissident’s nominees.164
Second, if the proxy form is signed but no specific instructions
are marked, the shares to which the proxy relates can be voted for
the company’s nominees.165
Third, when dissidents mail fight letters or other campaign materials to shareholders, they will not be able to include a ballot form
with their materials. Inclusion of a proxy or voting instruction form
would result in the dissident losing the exemption under Rule 14a164
See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No.
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No.
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,723–24 (Sept. 16, 2010).
165
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c) (2010); see also Facilitating Shareholder Director
Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,724 n.609 (Sept.
16, 2010) (“We anticipate that companies would continue to be able to solicit discretionary authority to vote a shareholder’s shares for the company nominees . . . .”).
Rule 14a-4(c) as amended prohibits proxy “slate voting” (on the grounds that it would
unduly favor management) but anticipates the continuation of discretionary voting by
management when authorized by shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(c) (2010).
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2(b)(1) that would otherwise apply to the fight letters and would
thus require the dissident to furnish its own proxy statement to all
solicited holders.166 Moreover, even if the SEC expands the exemption under Rule 14a-2(b)(1) to include solicitations where a dissident distributes only the company’s proxy and voting instruction
form, inclusion of such forms is not practical for beneficial holders.
Voting instructions supplied to beneficial holders are not generic
but carry unique, holder-specific control numbers.167 The holderspecific numbers on the company’s voting instruction form would
ordinarily not be available to the dissident, and a shareholder who
returns a form with the incorrect control number would not validly
vote her shares.
Campaign materials not accompanied by a proxy or voting instruction form are less effective. Any shareholder who, after reading the materials, decides to vote for the dissident has to search for
the ballot form sent to her by the company or, if that form has been
lost or has already been mailed back, has to request a new form. If
the shareholder neglects to do so, or changes her mind in the interim, the vote for the dissident is lost.
Finally, the design of the proxy card may result in a disproportionately large number of invalid votes from shareholders who
support the dissident nominees. In a director election, the maximum number of votes is equal to the number of available board
seats. As explained above, in a traditional proxy contest both the
company’s and the dissident’s forms are designed to assure that
shareholders do not overvote. In proxy access contests, however, a
shareholder may mark “for” for more nominees than there are
seats to fill. By definition, a shareholder who overvotes must have
voted for at least some dissident nominees. Moreover, most of
them presumably did so conscious of the fact that the company recommended a vote “against” all the dissident nominees. Dissidents
will thus effectively lose the support from these shareholders.

166

That rule exempts from the requirement to furnish a proxy statement certain solicitations where the person making the solicitation does not “seek . . . the power to
act as proxy . . . and does not furnish . . . a form of revocation, abstention, consent or
authorization.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (2010).
167
Personal communication with Charles V. Callan, Chief Regulatory Officer,
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Oct. 25, 2010).
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4. Fighting in the Dark
When shareholders submit their votes, they do not go into a
black ballot box that is left unopened until the shareholder meeting, when the votes are counted and the winner is declared. Rather,
information about who casts votes for whom becomes available
throughout the duration of the contest.
In traditional contests, shareholders who hold their shares directly on the company’s books (“registered holders”) receive proxy
forms directly from the company and from a dissident and return
the proxy they execute to the company or the dissident, as the case
may be. As to these proxies, each side will know who returned the
proxy form to it and how they voted, but neither side will know—
except by inference—who returned the proxy form to the other
side and how they voted. That is, the company, for example, will
see the proxies it receives, which will appoint some member of
management as proxy and, for the most part, authorize that person
to vote the shares as recommended by the company.168 From the
fact that certain proxies have not been returned, the company can
deduce that these shares have either not been voted yet or that
proxies were given to dissidents. Dissidents are in an analogous position.
Shareholders who hold shares through brokerage or bank accounts (“beneficial holders”)—a category that includes holders of
most of the outstanding shares—receive voting instruction forms
mailed to them by Broadridge on behalf of the company and the
dissident, with both sides using different forms, and return one of
the forms to Broadridge. In traditional contests, Broadridge provides both sides with daily vote tallies and weekly reports showing,
for each broker, how many shares have been voted and for whom
they have voted.169 We will refer to this information provided by
Broadridge, together with the information obtained from directly
returned proxies, as “preliminary voting information.”

168
In traditional contests, a shareholder may withhold authority to vote the shares in
a certain way but cannot require the proxy to vote the shares for a director nominee
not recommended by management.
169
Personal communication with Charles V. Callan, Chief Regulatory Officer,
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Oct. 25, 2010).
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Access to preliminary voting information is very important.
Proxy solicitors and their clients use it for several purposes.170 First,
most generally, they use it to determine whether their overall strategy is successful. If the results are close, the client may decide to
expend additional resources. If results indicate that the outcome is
clear, management or dissidents may decide to settle or fold rather
than spend more money on a hopeless campaign. Second, solicitors
can use the information to figure out whether major institutional
holders have voted their shares and how they voted. Even though
these holders usually hold their shares through banks or brokerages and no direct information on their voting is provided, solicitors have some general ideas about how many shares an institution
holds and which intermediary it uses. Thus, changes in the vote tallies provide a good indication of how certain institutions are voting.
Solicitors can accordingly engage in more effective solicitations of
these institutions. Third, solicitors can estimate how retail shareholders are voting and adjust their campaign message to this group
of holders. Fourth, as to registered holders, solicitors can engage in
targeted campaigns for holders who have not returned their proxy
forms. Finally, proxy solicitors can police for mistakes. As we have
discussed in an earlier article, the proxy voting system is prone to
administrative and clerical errors that can easily—and, under applicable law, irreversibly—affect the ultimate outcome of close
contests.171 And, as discussed above,172 mistakes involving overvoting may easily occur in proxy access contests.
In traditional contests, access to preliminary voting information
is roughly symmetrical: Broadridge provides the same information
to both sides, and, as to proxies directly returned by registered
holders, each side sees the proxies it gets but not those the other

170
Personal communication with Alan Miller, Co-chairman, Innisfree M&A, Inc.
(June 4, 2010).
171
See Kahan & Rock, Hanging Chads, supra note 68, at 1249–55, 1267–70. A recent, if extreme, example of such a mistake occurred in a proxy contest waged by
Terra Industries on the board election for CF Industries Holdings. The night before
the vote, a proxy solicitor noted that a vote by a large institutional holder who had
indicated support for its client had not been tallied. After inquiries, the solicitor determined that RiskMetrics, who had been hired by the institutional holder to deal
with the mechanics of voting, had mistakenly failed to vote the shares. RiskMetrics
was alerted to the mistake and managed to cast the vote before the ballot closed.
172
See supra Subsection III.B.3.
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side gets. In proxy access contests, by contrast, information is likely
to be completely one-sided. As to proxies sent directly to registered holders, shareholders can vote either for the company’s or
for the dissident’s nominees, but either way these proxies are returned to, and seen only by, the company. The dissident sees nothing. As to beneficial holders, Broadridge generally provides preliminary voting information only to clients who mail out their own
proxy forms. Dissidents who make no mailing to shareholders receive no information. Dissidents who mail fight letters and other
campaign materials but who do not mail a separate proxy statement and voting form receive preliminary information on the aggregate votes cast with respect to the director or issue they target
but no broker-specific voting information.173 Unless Broadridge
were to make significant changes in these policies, dissidents in
proxy access would receive substantially less preliminary voting information than companies do or than dissidents would receive in
traditional proxy contests.
That such disparate access to preliminary voting information is a
material disadvantage is corroborated by Professor Yair Listokin’s
study of the voting outcome of management-sponsored proposals.174 In these proposals, as under proxy access, shareholders can
vote for or against the proposal on the company’s proxy card, and
shareholders can campaign without having to file a proxy statement.175 As Listokin has shown, the voting outcome on these resolutions is highly skewed: management is overwhelmingly more
likely to win votes by a small margin than to lose by a small margin.
The most likely explanation is that management uses information
about the votes cast prior to the close of balloting and, when it appears that the vote is close, makes enhanced efforts to obtain additional votes for its side. The data presented by Listokin suggest
that these efforts are rather successful: of 68 “close” votes (with a
final voting result of between 47% and 53% for the management
proposal), management won 61 votes.176 If one assumes that, with173

Personal communication with Charles V. Callan, Chief Regulatory Officer,
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (Oct. 25, 2010).
174
Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 Am. L. & Econ.
Rev. 159, 175–78 (2008).
175
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) (2010).
176
See Listokin, supra note 174, at 179 tbl. 5.
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out the strategic advantage conferred on management by unilateral
access to preliminary voting results, management would have lost
half (or 34) of the close votes, then the effect of the strategic advantage is that 27 of these 34 losses—or 79%—turned into management wins. Even this 79% estimate understates the significance
of superior preliminary voting information since it assumes that
there were no contests which were close but which ended up, due
to enhanced efforts, not being close after all. Moreover, we believe
that Listokin’s study picks up mostly the effect of some last-minute
use of preliminary voting information and thus understates the
benefits of disparate access to such information.
5. Cumulative Voting
Proxy access involves a special disadvantage for the few companies that permit shareholders to use cumulative voting in the election of directors. In cumulative voting, a shareholder is given as
many votes per share as there are board positions to be filled and is
allowed to cast those votes for one nominee or to distribute them
in any way among the nominees. Cumulative voting, if used strategically, permits a minority of shareholders to secure minority board
representation by cumulating all their votes on a single nominee.
Consider a company with 1 million shares and a 9-member, annually elected board. Under regular voting, each shareholder can cast
1 vote per share for up to 9 nominees. In such a system, a shareholder group that controls 500,001 of the shares can secure the
election of all 9 nominees. Thus, even a group that controls 499,999
votes is not assured of getting even a single nominee elected. Under cumulative voting, a nominee who gets 900,001 votes is assured
election.177 Since any shareholder can cast all 9 of her votes for a
single nominee, it takes only 100,001 shares—roughly 10%—to be
assured of electing 1 nominee to the board.
To employ cumulative voting strategically, a dissident must ideally get proxies that give the dissident discretion to decide how to
cast the votes after the dissident knows the approximate level of
shareholder support for its nominees. In proxy contests in compa177
There are a total of 9 million votes to be cast, and the nominees with the 9 highest
vote levels are elected. If a nominee gets 900,001 votes, it is thus impossible that 9
other nominees each get more votes. Thus, that nominee is assured of being elected.
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nies with cumulative voting, proxies and voting instructions are designed to provide such discretion. Under proxy access, this is
unlikely to occur. The specific design of proxies and voting instructions for board elections involving cumulative voting is unclear.
Most likely, however, the proxies and voting instructions would resemble those distributed in elections not involving cumulative voting, meaning that 1—and only 1—vote will be cast for each nominee marked on the ballot. After all, if votes are to be cumulated,
then someone has to decide how to cumulate them, and there is no
likely candidate for doing so in proxy access.178 This means, in effect, that by using proxy access, a dissident would forego the significant advantage conferred by cumulative voting on dissidents
seeking minority representation.
6. Adverse Signal
A final adverse effect of proxy access is that its use would convey
a negative signal about the dissident. As discussed,179 proxy access
would generate modest cost savings but entail substantial strategic
disadvantages. For larger holders, the only ones eligible to use
proxy access under the SEC-adopted rule, these costs savings
would represent a trivial percentage of the value of the their
stakes. Take a typical midcap company, with a capitalization of
about $5 billion. A 3% stake in that company would amount to
$150 million. According to our estimates, the cost savings from
proxy access would amount to 1 or 2 hundredths of 1% of that
stake.
Now suppose that a dissident has a 3% stake, that the cost savings from proxy access are 0.03% of the dissident’s stake, and that
using proxy access would reduce the dissident’s chances of winning
by 10%. What would using proxy access signal about the dissident’s
view of the expected gains from winning a contest? If the dissident
believed that winning the contest would increase the stock price by
0.3% or more, the dissident should forego proxy access and wage a
traditional contest, because the benefits of using a traditional con-

178

Normally the person who solicits the proxies or the appointed proxy decides how
to cumulate the votes, but in proxy access this person has interests adverse to those of
the dissident shareholder.
179
See supra Section III.A; Subsections III.B.1–5.
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test would outweigh the cost savings from proxy access. In such a
case, a dissident’s decision to opt for proxy access would convey a
signal that the dissident does not believe that winning the contest
would have a material effect on the stock price. Such a signal, of
course, would be unlikely to attract votes.
C. Empirical Assessment
1. Number of Nominees
One important limitation of the proxy access rule is that a dissident may not nominate more than 25% of the board.180 To assess
the importance of that limitation, we examined the seats sought in
traditional proxy contests. In our sample of 129 contests, the dissident sought a majority of the total seats in 23% of the contests and
more than 25% of the seats in 91% of the contests. Hedge funds
were less likely to seek control, or more than 25%, of the seats
(13% and 88%, respectively), but dissidents other than hedge
funds were substantially more likely to do so (44% and 95%, respectively). In sum, judging from traditional campaigns, the limitation on the numbers of seats sought is an important disadvantage,
especially for dissidents other than hedge funds who often seek
control.
2. Success Rates and Margins
As discussed, using proxy access rather than waging a traditional
proxy contest entails several significant disadvantages that render
it more difficult to gain the requisite shareholder support.181 To estimate the size of these disadvantages and their impact on the outcome of proxy contests, we performed a number of calculations.
First, for our sample of traditional proxy contests, we calculated
the increase in the implicit vote threshold assuming (i) that the dissident nominates the maximum number of candidates permissible
by the proxy access rule and (ii) that shareholders who support the
dissident will cast their remaining votes for company nominees and
spread these votes evenly among the nominees. Under these assumptions, the average level of support required to win increased
180
181

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11(d) (2010).
See supra Section III.B.
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from a majority to 71% of the shares voted for a nominee. As discussed, the second of these assumptions is extreme.182 More reasonably, the implicit vote threshold would rise by about half that
amount to roughly 60% of the shares voted for a nominee. In addition, we estimate that not having one’s own proxy card, having to
fight in the dark, and sending an adverse signal, together would
cost a dissident another 5% of the votes.
In our sample of proxy contests in which a vote was held, dissidents won outright in 35 contests, dissidents won some seats in 9
contests, and management won in 52 contests. In the 44 contests in
which dissidents won some seats, 3 involved cumulative voting. In
these contests, proxy access entails even more severe disadvantages. For the 41 other contests, we calculated the swing—that is,
the percentage shift in votes from the dissident to the management
nominees—necessary for a dissident nominee to lose.183
Table 5: Results of Proxy Contests
Swing Range

Number of
Contests with
Dissident
Victories

Percentage of
Total Dissident
Victories—
All Companies

Percentage of
Total Dissident
Victories—
Capitalization
> $500 million

Percentage of Total
Dissident Victories—
Capitalization < $500
million

< 1%

4

9.8

15.4

7.1

1% - 2%

4

9.8

23.1

3.6

2% - 5%

5

12.2

15.4

10.7

5% - 7.5%

5

12.2

7.7

14.3
35.7

7.5% - 10%

12

29.3

15.4

10% - 15%

3

7.3

7.7

7.1

15% - 20%

2

4.9

0

7.1

20% - 30%

5

12.2

15.4

10.7

30% - 35%

1

2.4

0

3.6

If our quantification of the disadvantages of proxy access is correct, these data indicate that dissidents would have lost 33 of the 41
182

See supra Subsection III.B.2.
The swing was calculated by taking half of the difference between the votes for
the dissident nominee who got the lowest number of votes but still got elected (the
marginal dissident winner) and the votes for the management nominee who received
the highest number of votes but did not get elected (the marginal management loser)
and then dividing the difference by the number of the outstanding votes.
183
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contests that they won as a result of these disadvantages. Moreover, elections tend to be closer for regular-sized than for microcap companies.184 For regular-sized companies, 50% of the dissidents who won would have lost had 5% of the votes swung the
other way. And of the 4 contests in large companies (with a capitalization of more than $5 billion) in which dissidents gained board
representation, 3 would have been lost had as little as 2% of the
votes swung the other way. Thus, the disadvantages of proxy access
are relatively more important for larger companies.
The data on success rates and margins also indicate the difficulty, if not futility, of winning a proxy access contest without actively campaigning. The level of campaigning varied greatly within
the sample of traditional proxy contests, with some dissidents mailing several fight letters to all shareholders and making presentations to large holders and others relying mostly on the proxy
statement. However, in each serious contest, the campaign material
distributed went substantially beyond the 500-word supporting
statement permitted by the proxy access rule. Judging by the results of traditional contests, and taking into account the other disadvantages of proxy access, the chances of victory for a dissident
who uses proxy access and does not campaign would be remote.
3. Dissident Stakes and Savings
These limited costs savings resulting from proxy access have to
be evaluated not only in relation to the effect on winning the contests but also in relation to the dollar value of the dissident stakes.
As noted, these savings would normally amount to a few hundredths of 1% of the value of a 3% stake. Moreover, successful dissidents in traditional contests often seek and receive reimbursement of their costs for waging a proxy contest. As between, on the
one hand, waging a traditional contest, expending some more resources, but having a material likelihood of succeeding and then
possibly also getting the costs reimbursed; and, on the other hand,
184

Just looking at the swing margins of prior contests probably understates the adverse impact of proxy access. In contests which dissidents won by a large margin, it is
likely that management—looking at the preliminary voting results—realized that it
had no chance to win and stopped campaigning. But if the dissidents in these contests
had been burdened by the disadvantages of proxy access, the preliminary results
would have been much closer, and management might well have campaigned harder.
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waging a proxy access contest, expending fewer resources, and having a significantly reduced chance of succeeding and a correspondingly reduced chance of receiving reimbursement for any additional campaign expenditures,185 the choice, we believe, would be
an easy one.
D. Summary and Evaluation
Overall, for most dissidents, proxy access would not represent an
attractive alternative. The reduced chances of winning associated
with proxy access would generally outweigh the cost savings generated by it. For dissidents serious about winning, and who are considering significant outside campaigning (and spending the money
on it), using proxy access makes little sense.
IV. PROXY ACCESS VERSUS WITHHOLD VOTES
Proxy access may be attractive for dissidents who do not plan to
engage in outside campaigning and who are not really serious
about winning. For these types of dissidents, the major advantage
of proxy access is not merely a cost reduction but the virtual absence of any expenses. This has two implications: first, because the
costs of making a proxy access nomination are very low, it may
make sense to make a nomination even if the chances of success
are low. As a result, we would expect many of these nominations to
be unsuccessful. Second, some nominations may be made by dissidents who are virtually certain that they will not win for reasons
other than getting one’s nominee elected. These reasons may include trying to propagate certain ideas through the supporting
185
Dissidents in traditional contests state whether they will seek reimbursement in
their proxy statement, the granting of which is within the discretion of the board. If
dissidents obtain control, they have the power to award themselves the reimbursement. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1071, 1108–09 (1990). If they settle,
the agreement sometimes provides for a reimbursement of expenses. If they obtain
minority representation, they have at least an argument that shareholders wanted
them to get reimbursed. Dissidents in proxy access contests can also seek reimbursement but, in our view, are less likely to obtain reimbursement since (i) they will never
have board control, (ii) they will never have stated in the proxy statement that they
will seek reimbursement, and (iii) the board may take the position that the company
already subsidized the proxy contest by providing proxy access and that no further
reimbursement is warranted.
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statement and gaining publicity for the shareholder and/or the
nominee.
But even for highly cost-conscious dissidents, another alternative
presents itself. Instead of starting a proxy access contest, these dissidents could use another, equally low-cost strategy: withhold their
votes from some of the company nominees and perhaps engage in
low-cost efforts to induce other shareholders to withhold their
votes.186 In this Part, we examine this alternative. As we will show,
even for highly cost-conscious dissidents, a withhold campaign will
often be a better option than a proxy access contest.
A. Plusses of Proxy Access: Effect of Winning
A proxy access nomination entails one major plus over a withhold campaign: if the contest is successful, its effects are stronger,
and more certain, than those of a withhold vote. The technical legal
effect of a director receiving less than a majority of the votes cast in
a withhold campaign depends on the voting rules in place at the
corporation. Most companies subscribe to one of three different
voting rules:187 the old, unmodified plurality regime that remains
the default rule in Delaware and most other states;188 an official bylaw (or charter provision) that changes the default rule for uncontested elections to a majority standard; or a “policy” adopted by
the corporation to require each nominee to submit an irrevocable
offer to resign from the board should she receive less than the majority of the votes cast in an uncontested election.189
In companies with a plurality regime, in an uncontested election,
a nominee who receives less than a majority of the votes is elected
to the board just like a nominee who receives more than a major-

186

Such low-cost efforts may take the form of a press release explaining why the dissident is withholding its votes, an amendment to the dissident’s Schedule 13D or 13G
making such points, or a letter to proxy advisors urging them to recommend a withhold vote. Most dissidents who qualify for proxy access would be subscribing to the
services of proxy advisors and would have sufficient financial clout to have their press
releases picked up by wire services.
187
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 987,
1010 n.152 (2010).
188
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216(3) (Supp. 2010).
189
See id. § 141(b).
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ity.190 In companies with a board policy, such a nominee is also
elected, but the other board members have to decide whether to
accept her resignation. Under a majority vote bylaw, the nominee
who receives less than a majority is not elected. Nor, of course, is
anyone else. But under Section 141(b) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, each director remains in office until her “successor is elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or removal.”191 Thus, if the nominee who receives less than a
majority is a member of the incumbent board,192 she will remain in
office until the vacancy created by her non-election is filled. Generally, the resulting vacancy can be filled by the board, and at least
in theory nothing prevents the board from appointing that nonelected nominee to the vacancy created by her non-election.193
190

In uncontested elections, the number of nominees is the same as the number of
board seats to fill, so it technically takes just a single vote to get the requisite plurality.
191
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(b).
192
The nominee would not remain on the board as a holdover if she had not been an
incumbent. Also, the statute is not clear as to who would remain as a holdover if two
of the incumbent directors are not re-elected and a single vacancy is created. This can
occur, for example, where one of the incumbents does not run for re-election and the
other runs but fails to receive the requisite majority. Since directors run for the board
as a whole, rather than for specific seats, there is no a priori way to distinguish between these two potential holdover directors. The latter hypothetical raises the issue
of whether the statute ought to be applied at all to a situation where some nominees
are elected and others are not. Though phrased in terms of an individual director
(“[e]ach director shall hold office”), it may make more sense to view the provision as
applying to the whole board; that is, a board remains in place until a successor board
is elected. See id. An election where some, but not all, nominees fail to get a majority
would then produce a vacancy without any holdover directors, which does not generate much of a problem. Moreover, such an interpretation would avoid several problematic scenarios, for example, one where several board members fail to get a majority, remain as holdover directors, and then appoint themselves to the vacancies over
the objection of board members who were properly elected.
193
For a recent Delaware opinion on majority vote bylaws, see City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System v. Axcelis Technologies., Inc., 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010).
Axcelis involved a board-adopted bylaw that mandated that a director who did not
receive a majority of the votes tender her resignation but which also gave the board
discretion whether to accept the resignation. See id. at 283–84. In determining
whether plaintiffs had established “proper purpose” to inspect books and records under Delaware General Corporation Law, tit. 8, § 220(b), the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld the Chancery Court’s finding that a board decision not to accept the
resignation did not by itself establish a credible basis to infer wrongdoing. Id. at 291.
In so holding, the Delaware Supreme Court held that such board decisions, without
additional evidence showing an entrenchment motive, are to be analyzed under the
business judgment rule and not the Unocal or Blasius tests, even if they take place
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Moreover, independent of the technical effect, a nominee (and
the company on the board of which he serves) who receives less
than a majority without having an opponent, or even a substantial
withhold percentage short of a majority, suffers substantial embarrassment. Shareholders are sending a message to such companies,
and companies may respond to these messages regardless of the
technical effect of the withhold vote. In addition, the threatened infliction of such embarrassment gives shareholders leverage.194
Compare these effects to the effect of a successful proxy access
contest. Should the shareholder nominee receive more votes than
one of the company nominees, the shareholder nominee would be
elected and the company nominee who received fewest votes
would not be elected.195 How important this is in practice depends
to a large degree on the level of recalcitrance of the board majority
and on the person elected. Proxy access would not afford shareholders the opportunity to elect a majority of the board. By intention and design, shareholder nominees elected via proxy access
would thus be a minority. Since board decisions are generally taken

during a battle for control. Id. at 288–91. The narrow ruling, however, may well not
apply to shareholder-adopted majority voting bylaws or to better-crafted Section 220
requests that focus on investigating the suitability of directors whose resignations
were rejected.
194
It also deserves mention that, under the law of Delaware and some other states,
shareholders can adopt a majority bylaw which could not then be amended by the
board. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216(b) (Supp. 2010) (codifying amendment
adopted in 2006 to provide binding bylaws adopted by shareholders that prescribe
vote requirements for director elections). Other states that have adopted legislation
to enable shareholders to provide for forms of majority voting include California, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See Claudia H. Allen,
Majority Voting in Director Elections—An Activist Success Story, Neal, Gerber &
Eisenberg LLP (Nov. 13 2007), http://www.ngelaw.com/news/pubs_detail.aspx?
ID=777. Such a bylaw could be proposed via a binding shareholder resolution under
Rule 14a-8. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 216 (“A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for the election of directors
shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors.”). Thus, to the
extent that the plurality regime or a resignation policy is not sufficiently effective, in
most companies shareholders can take action to adopt a more effective majority voting bylaw.
195
In many instances, the board could place the non-elected company nominee on
the board by expanding the board size and filling the resulting vacancy with the company nominee.
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by majority vote,196 the elected board nominees, if voting together,
could always outvote the elected shareholder nominee.
Even having a seat at the table where decisions are made is,
upon final analysis, contingent. The board could, at its first meeting, create a board committee—consisting of all board members
except the shareholder nominee—and delegate to this committee
most board powers, effectively shutting the shareholder nominee
out of the discussion and information process.197 While such an extreme measure may be unlikely, boards have significant discretion
over what matters are primarily decided in committee and over
who sits on which committee. Thus, through the proper work division and committee membership designation, the participation of
the shareholder nominee in the discussion and information process
could be reduced.198
B. Minuses of Proxy Access
While proxy access has an advantage over a withhold campaign,
it also entails substantial disadvantages: the likelihood of winning a
withhold vote is significantly higher than the likelihood of winning
a proxy access contest, and a good showing short of victory in a
withhold vote may have a greater effect than a close loss in a proxy
access campaign.

196
It is possible to change this by bylaw, but it would probably require an active solicitation.
197
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(c)(2) (Supp. 2010) (permitting delegation of any
power to such a committee other than the power to approve or recommend any action that requires shareholder approval and the power to amend bylaws).
198
This could be done in a subtle and discreet manner so that the sidelining of the
shareholder nominee would be less apparent. All of this, of course, presupposes that
the shareholder nominee would differ significantly from the board nominees along
dimensions other than the fact that she was selected by shareholders and that the
other board members, for that reason, would want to sideline her. On this issue, as
well, there are some doubts. Also note that directors have information rights under
state law and thus cannot be shut out completely from the information process. Id.
§ 220(d). In public companies, however, the additional information that comes from
these information rights, and the capacity to use it, are very limited.
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1. Higher Voting Threshold
As explained in the preceding Part,199 it takes more votes to succeed in the proxy access contest than in a traditional proxy contest.
This is equally true when comparing a proxy access contest to a
withhold vote. To generate a majority withhold vote that results in
a nominee not being elected or triggers her resignation, shareholders must cast more “withhold” than “for” votes for a specific nominee, with abstentions and non-votes being ignored. As a result, it
just takes a majority of the voting shares to generate a majority
withhold vote. But, as discussed above, it will likely take a substantially greater fraction of the voting shares to get a nominee elected
via proxy access.
2. Negative Versus Positive Campaigning
A further disadvantage of a proxy access campaign compared to
a withhold vote is that it would be more difficult to get shareholder
support for a proxy access campaign. First, and most fundamentally, it is easier to get other shareholders to agree to be against
something than to be in favor of something. In a withhold campaign, other shareholders just have to agree to oppose a specific
company nominee. By contrast, in a proxy access campaign, they
are asked to put the dissident nominee on the board instead of a
company nominee. Even if these other shareholders believe that
the present board or a certain director has not done a good job and
would thus want either to send a general message to the board to
mend its ways or to remove a specific director, they may not necessarily agree that putting the dissident nominee on the board would
lead to an improvement.
The purely negative structure of withhold votes also means that
they involve little downside risk. So what if a qualified company
nominee receives a majority withhold vote? Unless the nominee is
the company’s CEO, she can probably be replaced by another similarly qualified director. This may generate some work, but has no
material impact on the company. Moreover, as explained below, a
majority withhold vote may not result in the removal of the director from the board, but instead generate other sought-after
199

See supra Subsection III.B.2.
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changes.200 In comparison, placing a dissident nominee who does
not deserve election on the board is potentially more serious business. Put differently, the very advantage of a proxy access contest—that, if it succeeds, it is certain to replace a board member
with a dissident nominee—may lead shareholders to be more
guarded in voting for a dissident nominee than in withholding their
vote from a company nominee.
It will be especially difficult to make the affirmative case for voting for the dissident nominee without significant campaigning.
While dissidents would get to include a 500-word supporting
statement in the company’s proxy materials,201 this is very limited
space to make such an affirmative case. At the very minimum, we
believe, the dissident would ordinarily have to supplement the
supporting statement with low-level campaign efforts, such as press
releases and letters soliciting the support from proxy advisors.202
But even with such supplements, it will not be easy to explain convincingly to other shareholders why electing the dissident nominee
would be in their interest.
Moreover, proxy access opens the door to more effective campaigning by the company. In withhold contests, the ability of the
company to campaign is somewhat limited by the nature of the
contest. The company nominee targeted for a withhold vote is running against no one. To campaign, the company has to argue, in effect, that the company nominee is doing a good enough job to deserve being elected. This positive campaigning can be difficult—
usually nominees targeted for a withhold vote have been so targeted for a reason—and implicitly draws attention to the nominee’s
shortcomings. By contrast, in a proxy access campaign, the company could attack the dissident’s nominees via negative campaigning. Even casual observation of political campaigns suggests that

200

See infra Section IV.C.
See supra text accompanying note 147.
202
If the dissident goes much beyond such efforts and makes a mailing to shareholders, it will probably pay to wage a traditional contest rather than a proxy access contest.
201
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this is much easier than positive campaigning.203 In fact, in traditional proxy contests, such attacks are common.204
The company may not merely attack the dissident nominee. It
may also attack the dissident shareholder who made the nomination. Such attacks are particularly likely to be credible and effective
if the dissident shareholder has arguable conflicts of interest. Most
evidently, allegations of conflicts can be made for dissident shareholders who are affiliated with labor and employee interests. Other
shareholders, who are interested predominantly in maximizing the
economic value of the stakes, may worry that a nominee put forth
by such groups will push the company to pursue the labor interests
at the expense of profit maximization or that lending support to
such a candidate will provide leverage to labor groups to extract
concessions in exchange for withdrawing the nomination. In addition, public pension funds and hedge funds are vulnerable to being
attacked for alleged conflicts. The boards of trustees of public pension funds typically consist of political appointees, politicians serving ex officio, or beneficiary representatives.205 Beneficiary representatives often have ties to organized labor.206 Thus, public
pension fund trustees, who have little personal financial stake in
maximizing the returns of the funds, may plausibly pursue other interests. Politicians and political appointees may purse political

203

See, e.g., Eric Ferkenhoff, Icahn Appears to Fall Short at Motorola, N.Y. Times,
May 8, 2007, at C1 (detailing personal criticisms by Icahn of Motorola’s board).
204
See, e.g., The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders, Definitive Additional Proxy Materials Filed by Non-Registrant (Form DFAN 14A) (Jan. 18,
2007) [hereinafter The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders],
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/864683/000119312507008489/
ddfan14a.htm (containing a fight letter by dissidents citing to and refuting attacks by
company).
205
See, e.g., Board Members, CalPERS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
index.jsp?bc=/about/organization/board/members/home.xml; Structure and Responsibilities, CalPERS (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/
organization/board/structure-responsibilities.xml.
206
See, e.g., Benn Steil, California’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, Wall St. J., Mar. 7,
2008, at A14 (“Calpers is a political entity in every sense of the word. Its board is
comprised of . . . six elected members—all six of whom have long ties to organized labor, including the board president . . . who is also executive vice president of the California Labor Federation. Calpers’s investment policies are politically driven, often
dictated by the legislature, and even involve foreign policy goals.”).
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goals such as increasing in-state investment,207 getting favorable PR,
or benefiting significant donors.208 Beneficiary representatives may
pursue labor goals.
These issues have particular salience for some of the most activist public pension funds. CalPERS, the New York State Retirement Fund, and the New York City Pension Funds have all been
involved in “pay to play” scandals.209 CalPERS has been criticized
for the presence of union representatives on its board and the prounion stance it has taken in various labor disputes.210 The New
York City Pension Funds, though making a fair number of governance proposals, make more than twice as many social and environmental proposals and tout the engagement of (former) Comptroller William Thompson—the ex officio chief investment advisor
of the funds—on climate change.211 Former New York State and
207
See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 796–98 (1993).
208
See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Cuomo Issues 100 Subpoenas in Pension Fund Inquiry,
N.Y. Times, May 2, 2009, at A17.
209
See id. (discussing investigation by Attorney General Cuomo into pay to play in
New York pension funds); Craig Karmin & Peter Lattman, Calpers Rocked By ‘Pay
to Play,’ Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A1 (discussing pay to play at CalPERS).
210
See Calpers and Cronyism, Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 2004, at A18 (noting political and
union ties of CalPERS board members and accusing board of basing investment decision on political goals of labor and the Democratic Party); Jim Carlton & Jonathan
Weil, Ouster Isn’t Expected to Alter Calpers Policy, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 2004, at C3
(noting that CalPERS has been criticized for “meddling in political and labor-union
issues with little connection to improving shareholder returns”); Jonathan Weil &
Joann S. Lublin, Gadfly Activism at Calpers Leads to Possible Ouster of President,
Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2004, at A1 (noting controversial CalPERS actions in interceding
on behalf of striking employees of a portfolio company).
211
The New York City Pension Funds’ 2006 Shareholder Proposals, The New York
City Pension Funds 4–17 (2006), http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bam/
corp_gover_pdf/2006-shareholder-report.pdf; see also id. at 4 (“Comptroller Thompson has played a leading role in the efforts of the Investor Network on Climate Risk
(INCR) . . . . INCR has taken steps to pressure Wall Street firms, securities regulators
and companies to provide deeper analysis and disclosure on the business risks and
opportunities of climate change. In June 2006, Comptroller Thompson joined with 27
members of INCR in a letter to SEC Chairman Cox expressing concern that climate
change poses material risks to companies in which INCR members are invested . . . .
On September 20, 2006, the New York City Comptroller’s Office participated in a
meeting between INCR members and SEC Commissioner Roel Campos in an effort
to push the SEC towards the adoption of an SEC rule that would require companies
to disclose climate change risks in their financial reports. Commissioner Campos expressed deep interest in the issue and offered his active participation in advancing the
initiative.”); Postseason Report 2007 Shareholder Proposal Programs & Other Share-
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New York City Comptroller Alan Hevesi (and the head of the respective pension systems) pled guilty to charges of defrauding the
government212 and to more serious felony corruption charges for
awarding pension investment business in exchange for gifts.213 The
current New York City Comptroller John Liu has been criticized
for using a trip to Ireland to gain political, rather than investment,
returns.214
3. Finding a Nominee
Given the possibility of highly one-sided campaigning and of getting attacked and not defended, one wonders who would agree to
become a dissident nominee. The dissident would want to nominate a person with experience, a good track record, independence,
and an unimpeachable character to minimize susceptibility to negative campaigning against the nominee or the dissident herself.
Warren Buffet, to use an extreme example, may not have to worry
much about negative ads and, even if nominated by a union pension fund, may receive a lot of shareholder support. The Warren
Buffets of this world, of course, usually have better things to do
than run as dissident nominees. Someone less famous and accomplished than Buffet may well have second thoughts about entering
a campaign in which she can expect to be attacked and have her record presented in the least favorable light by a company with significant campaign funds, while the dissident who nominated her

ownership Initiatives of the New York City Pension Funds & Retirement Systems,
The New York City Pension Funds & Retirement Systems 4 (2007),
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bam/corp_gover_pdf/2007-Shareholderreport.pdf (“On March 19, 2007, Comptroller Thompson joined with Ceres, dozens of
institutional investors, and a dozen leading U.S. companies and called on U.S. lawmakers to enact strong federal legislation to address global climate change . . . . The
investors and companies emphasized their concerns that the uncertainty surrounding
climate policy and the lack of federal regulations may be undermining the long-term
competitiveness of companies by discouraging new investments in clean energy and
energy-efficient technologies.”).
212
See Michael Cooper, Hevesi Pleads Guilty to a Felony and Resigns, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 2006, at B1.
213
Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, Hevesi Pleads Guilty in Pension Case,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2010, at A19.
214
See Michael Corkery & Michael Howard Saul, Comptroller’s Ireland Trip Questioned, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 2010, at A17.
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will make little effort, and expend minimal funds, to defend her.215
To be sure, for the right price, nominees can be found or the dissident can simply nominate one of its own officials. But this involves
expense (if the dissident ends up paying the nominee), and, more
importantly, it reduces the independence of the nominee from the
dissident shareholder (if the nominee is paid or is an official with
the dissident) and increases the credibility of accusations of conflict.
4. Effect of “Losing”
The final drawback of proxy access compared to a withhold
campaign relates to the effect of losing. In a proxy access campaign, if the dissident nominees are not elected, the company can
claim victory and vindication: shareholders have been offered a
real choice between two live candidates and rejected the candidate
nominated by the dissident.
In a withhold vote, by contrast, the company may be the de facto
loser even if its candidate receives more “for” than “withhold”
votes. Getting a substantial, but less than a majority, withhold vote
is still an embarrassment and often induces board actions. Having,
say, 40% of the shareholders withhold their vote from you in order
to vote for no one is quite different from having an opponent in a
contested election get 40% to your 60%. In the mother-of-all withhold campaigns—the 2004 campaign against Disney CEO Michael
Eisner—Eisner received a majority “for” vote but was nevertheless
ousted shortly thereafter.216 This experience is not singular. For example, after some directors received a 25% withhold vote, International Paper decided to heed shareholder requests to dismantle its
staggered board.217 According to proxy solicitors, some companies
regard withhold percentages of as low as 15-20% as problematic

215

See The Committee for Concerned Cyberonics, Inc. Shareholders, supra note 204
(containing a dissident mailing defending the record of its nominees against attacks
from company).
216
See supra text accompanying notes 59–63.
217
News Release, International Paper, International Paper Board of Directors Announces Annual Director Elections (Oct. 17, 2007), http://investor.
internationalpaper.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=73062&p=irol-newsArticle_Print&ID=1064
053&highlight=.
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and will make additional solicitation efforts to increase the “for”
votes.218
C. Empirical Assessment
Among Russell 3000 companies, 82 director nominees in 2009
and 31 directors nominees in 2008 received a majority withhold
vote in uncontested elections.219 Of these nominees, 7 were running
for board seats at companies that had adopted a resignation policy,
and one was running at a company that had implemented a majority standard for election to the board.
Of the 113 nominees with majority withholds, 4 (the director
subject to a majority standard and 3 subject to a regular plurality
standard) were not elected or resigned, and one director died
within a year.220 However, even for most of the other 108 directors,
the majority withhold votes had a substantial impact that appears
to have satisfied the concerns that triggered the withhold votes in
the first instance.
To determine the basis for the withhold vote, we examined the
voting recommendations by ISS, the most influential proxy advisor,
which state the reason for any withhold recommendation.221 These
reasons fell into 6 categories: failure to attend at least 75% of the
board meetings, membership on an excessive number of boards,
lack of independence (often coupled with service on certain committees, adoption of a poison pill without shareholder approval,
failure to implement shareholder proposal that received majority
support, and compensation-related issues. This listing suggests that
218
Personal communication with Alan Miller, Co-chairman, Innisfree M&A, Inc.
(June 4, 2010).
219
Gretchen Morgenson, Too Many ‘No’ Votes To Be Ignored, N.Y. Times, Sept.
20, 2009, at BU1. There were 84 directors in 2009 and 32 in 2008, but two of these directors (of Zapata Corp.) were not elected because different director candidates received a higher vote than they did, and for one further (of Alico), the company had
agreed to support a different nominee in his stead. We thus disregarded these 3 directors.
220
The respective companies with directors subject to a resignation policy did not
accept any of the 7 resignations.
221
See Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 105, at 869, 871. We caution that the ISS rationale is not necessarily the only reason why directors receive withhold votes. In fact,
many directors for whom ISS issues a withhold recommendation for the same reason,
and sometimes at the same company and the same year as the nominees who received
majority withholds, receive a majority “for” vote.
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often the main aim of the withhold recommendation is to induce
corporate changes, rather than to remove the director at issue from
the board. The reaction of companies and shareholders we discuss
below suggests that this is indeed the case.
For the nominees who did not leave the board within one year
and whose companies were not acquired or about to be acquired
by the next annual meeting (98 nominees), we considered whether
they were re-nominated, whether the company had taken any steps
to address the shareholder concern, and how the nominees at issue
fared in the 2010 board elections. Specifically, for those nominees
who were re-nominated, we judged whether the company had adequately addressed the issue by the percentage of withhold votes
they received the following year. Generally, if the nominee received less than 10% withholds, we considered the company as
having addressed the issue to the satisfaction of shareholders and if
the nominee received more than 40% withholds, we considered the
company as not having addressed the issue to the satisfaction of
shareholders.222 When the board was staggered and the nominee
was not up for reelection the following year, or when the nominee
received between 10% and 40% withholds, we considered several
factors, including (i) our own evaluation of the company’s response
to the ISS basis for a withhold recommendation, (ii) the presence
of a secondary reason that may have accounted for the majority
withhold vote and whether the company addressed that reason,
and (iii) the withhold percentage received by other board nominees. For nominees who received withhold votes in 2008, we further judged whether that reason was addressed in the second year
following the withhold vote. Based on our evaluation, 67 of the 98
withhold votes resulted in a company response that was satisfactory (including 2 in which the nominee was not re-nominated and 7
relating to a 2008 withhold vote that were addressed in the second
year following the vote);223 28 did not result in a satisfactory response (including 2 in which the nominee received another majority withhold vote in the following year); and in 3 instances, it was
unclear whether the response was satisfactory or not.
222

Note that for 2010 results, unlike for 2009 and 2008, shares voted by brokers
without instructions from the beneficial owner are not included in the “for” vote
count.
223
2 of these 7 directors received a second withhold vote in 2009.
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Note that the cases in which the response was not satisfactory
were concentrated among smaller companies. Of the 28 nominees
in companies with unsatisfactory responses, none were directors at
an S&P 500 large-cap company, 3 were directors at an S&P 400
mid-cap company, and 24 were directors at an S&P 600 small-cap
company. By comparison, for the 10 nominees at S&P 500 companies, every company addressed the concerns that gave rise to the
withhold vote. Another notable aspect of the data is the rarity of
majority withhold votes at companies that had adopted a majority
standard for the election of directors and, to a lesser extent, at
companies with a resignation policy. This may be due to any of the
following factors: companies with a majority standard for election
or with resignation policies may be more successful in avoiding majority withhold votes because they campaign more heavily for “for”
votes; shareholders at companies with a majority standard for election or with resignation policies may be more careful in voting
“withhold” if this may result in a majority withhold vote since their
real aim is to induce the company or the director to make changes,
rather than remove the director from the board; companies with a
majority standard for election or with resignation policies may address the shareholder concerns before they result in a majority
withhold vote; or withhold campaigns may be used to pressure
companies to adopt majority voting. To the extent that either of
the first 2 reasons account for the scarcity of majority withhold
votes, they would result, to an even greater extent, in a scarcity of
successful proxy access contests.
When a withhold vote did occur, the margin tended to be narrow. The average (median) percentages of the shares voting withhold, relative to the shares voting either “for” or “withhold,” were
56.25% (54.89%) in 2009 and were 55.11% (55.57%) in 2008. The
withhold percentage exceeded 60% in only 24 votes and never exceeded 70%.224
224

These figures, however, somewhat understate the degree of shareholder opposition. In 2008 and 2009, uninstructed shares held through brokers could still be voted
for the company nominees. To estimate the degree to which such shares may have reduced the withhold vote margin, we considered whether another issue (such as a
shareholder proposal) was on the ballot for which uninstructed shares could not be
voted. This permitted us to estimate the number of uninstructed shares. We then assumed, conservatively, that all these shares had been voted for the board nominees.
(During 2009, about one-half of uninstructed shares were voted, by each broker, in
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The set of nominees who received majority withhold votes may
represent a potentially fertile set of targets for proxy access. Obviously, these nominees already face substantial opposition from
shareholders. Nevertheless, we do not believe that dissident nominees would have had an easy time prevailing against most of these
nominees.
First, the principal reason for the withhold nominations may not
be known by the time a dissident has to make a proxy access nomination. For example, the company discloses whether directors attended at least 75% of the meetings only when it files its proxy
statement. At that point, however, it would be too late for a dissident to nominate someone else to defeat a director who had missed
many meetings.
Second, as later developments indicate, many if not most of
these withhold votes were aimed at achieving a corporate change
other than the removal of the director at issue. Regardless of the
reason for the ISS withhold recommendation, the nominees seem
to be able to receive a large majority in the next board election as
long as the company takes proper rectifying measures. Take, for
example, Syniverse Holdings, where all 8 directors received majority withhold votes in 2009. The reason for the ISS withhold recommendation was that the company adopted a poison pill without
shareholder approval. The company then promised that the pill
would either be terminated or submitted to a shareholder vote in
2011, and the directors were reelected in 2010 with a 94% “for”
vote margin.225 Or take Sir Peter Bonfield, who attended fewer than
75% of the board meetings of Mentor Graphics and received a mathe same proportion as the actual instructions received by that broker. See
Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc., Broadridge Report on Rule 452: The Elimination of the Broker Vote for Director Elections—Analysis of the Impact During the
First Proxy Season 25–31 (2010), available at www.broadridgeinfo.com/.%20.%20./
MASTER%20Steering%20Comm%2010-19-10%20FINAL.pdf). We subtracted the
respective number from the “for” votes received by the nominee and recalculated the
withhold vote margin. Using this methodology for the 2009 withhold votes, the average and median withhold vote margins rose by about 6.5%.
Note, however, that once uninstructed broker shares may no longer be voted, the
company may make enhanced efforts to induce holders to submit voting instructions.
As a result, our methodology may result in an overestimate of the withhold vote margin.
225
Syniverse Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 6, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1169264/000119312510112812/d8k.htm.
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jority withhold vote in 2009. His attendance record improved in the
following year and he was reelected in 2010 with 93% of the vote.226
As a result, we do not believe that a majority withhold vote generally translates to majority support for a dissident nominee.
Third, even shareholders who would ideally like to oust a certain
director from the board may not vote for a dissident nominee because they consider the dissident nominee to be even worse. This
may be the case because the dissident nominee lacks the proper
professional qualifications, because shareholders distrust the dissident shareholder who made the nomination, or because they believe that election of a dissident would reduce board effectiveness.
Fourth, as discussed, it is likely that a company would campaign
more heavily—and more effectively—against a dissident nominee
than it presently does when faced with a large withhold vote. At
present, companies where nominees received a majority withhold
vote engaged in little open campaigning.227 A small minority of
companies mailed an additional letter to shareholders explaining
why they should vote for certain nominees, and a few more mailed
reminders to shareholders to vote, but most engaged in no open
campaigning at all. If faced with a dissident nominee, we believe
that this would be likely to change.
In rare instances, however, a dissident nominee may succeed.
Take Ralph Atkin, a director of Skywest who received a 63%
withhold vote in 2009, presumably because of concerns about his
independence. Apparently nothing was done, and in 2010 he received a 68% withhold vote.228 Repeated ineffective withhold votes
may eventually induce frustrated shareholders to support a dissident nominee. But then take Ralf Boer, a director of Plexus who
received majority withhold votes in 2008 and 2009. Boer was a
partner in a law firm that billed Plexus $500,000 in 2008, and, the
following year, Plexus adopted a poison pill without shareholder
226
Mentor Graphics Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 1, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/701811/000119312510153532/d8k.htm.
227
By open campaigning, we mean campaigning that requires the company to make
additional filings with the SEC.
228
Skywest, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 4, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/793733/000110465910027128/a106140_38k.htm. Though the withhold margin in 2010 appeared to have been higher, the
withhold margin in 2009, when uninstructed broker votes are filtered out, as discussed
supra note 222 and accompanying text, was 69%.
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approval.229 By the time of the 2010 annual meeting, Boer’s law
firm’s billings had dropped to $5,000, and, although the poison pill
appears to have remained in place, Boer was reelected in 2010 with
90% of the vote.230 Even repeated majority withhold votes thus may
generate no hard feelings if the company shapes up.
D. Summary and Evaluation
A proxy access nomination, without significant outside campaigning, may be a plausible alternative to a withhold campaign. In
both cases, the costs are low, and success in a proxy access campaign assures a change in board composition. Moreover, the fact
that a majority of shareholders sometimes withholds its votes without any open campaign shows that a proxy access nomination
without campaigning is not necessarily doomed to fail.
Nevertheless, we believe that successful proxy access nominations will be extremely rare. It will be harder to obtain the requisite
majority because proxy access involves an implicitly higher voting
threshold. It will be harder to obtain shareholder support because
of the affirmative nature of the support required and concern over
the dissident’s goals. It will be hard to find qualified nominees due
to the lack of support they are receiving from the dissident. Finally,
by the time proxy access nominations are due, it may not yet be
clear which companies or company nominees would be most vulnerable to a proxy access campaign.
And even as to companies or nominees who are clearly vulnerable, there may not be a shareholder (or group of shareholders)
who is both qualified to make a proxy access nomination and interested in doing so. As discussed, to be eligible to make a proxy access nomination, a shareholder (or a group of shareholders) must
have a sizeable equity stake of 3% and must satisfy a lengthy holding period of 3 years. No such requirements apply to a shareholder
who wants to withhold its votes or encourage others to do so.
Moreover, most large institutional investors, who would most easily satisfy these requirements, have been reluctant to become
openly active but are perfectly willing to withhold votes from com229

Other Plexus directors did not receive a majority withhold vote.
Plexus Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/785786/000095012310012127/c56287e8vk.htm.
230
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pany nominees. We thus predict that withhold votes will remain
the preferred method for shareholders to signal dissatisfaction to
the company.
V. MUCH ADO ABOUT LITTLE: THE MARGINAL IMPACT OF
PROXY ACCESS
We would expect proxy access to result in few nominations. Of
the nominations made, few would result in the election of dissident
directors. And the dissident directors elected would have little impact on the companies. Thus, in our view, proxy access does not
amount to much, and the statements made by the supporters and
detractors of proxy access are greatly overblown.
This being said, proxy access would have some marginal consequences. In this Part, we discuss these effects: some positive, others
negative. On the whole, the net effect of proxy access is likely to be
close to zero and surely is not high enough to get very excited
about.
A. Costs
Dissident nominations generate costs. Faced with the possibility
that a dissident nominee will get elected to a board, the company
may campaign against the nominee. In doing so, the company will,
in effect, spend shareholders’ money.
As we have argued before, we do not believe that proxy access
would generate a slew of nominees. However, given the low costs
of making a nomination and the possibility of goals other than getting the nominee elected, nominations might be made even if the
chances of success are highly remote. In fact, as discussed, we
would expect that more serious dissidents would opt for a withhold
campaign or a traditional proxy contest rather than for proxy access and that proxy access would predominantly be used by dissidents with low chances of success.
On the other hand, the marginal cost to the company of including the nominee and the supporting statement in its material is trivial. For dissident nominees who stand virtually no chance of getting
elected, the company would not need to expend material resources
in assuring their defeat. As it is, companies already incur some—
although, we believe, lower—expenses to generate a high percent-
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age of “for” votes or to defeat shareholder proposals. This being
said, any increase in campaign expenses generated by proxy access
would be a downside that has to be weighed against any benefits
produced by proxy access and companies, being risk averse, may
end up spending a lot more than needed to defeat a marginal
shareholder nominee.
B. Unholy Alliance
A second potential downside of proxy access relates to the possibility of dissident nominations by shareholder groups who pursue
interests that diverge from the interests of shareholders as a whole.
The Wall Street Journal, for example, editorialized that proxy access will empower unions to threaten to run opposition candidates
to extract political concessions, such as support for health care reform.231 Other groups, such as public pension funds, social-issue
oriented funds, hedge funds, and former insiders, may have divergent interests and may be tempted to use proxy access to advance
their personal agendas. This is the “proxy access” equivalent of
greenmail—and leaves shareholders worse off.
While there is a possibility that proxy access may be abused by
some shareholder groups, we do not think that any abuse would be
likely to have a serious impact. First, any single union or unionaffiliated fund would very rarely own the requisite amount of stock
to make nominations, and hedge funds would rarely satisfy the 3year holding period requirement. Thus, these shareholders would
have to assemble groups of like-minded investors and even then
would not easily be able to satisfy the thresholds. The same would
be true, albeit to a lesser degree, for public pension funds.
If these shareholders succeed in forming a group that meets the
proxy access threshold requirements, they will have difficulty succeeding in extracting political concessions. As we argued above,
the presence of, or even the suspicion of, divergent interests by the
dissident makes it unlikely that nominees will succeed. Efforts to
extract political concessions, or otherwise pursue personal interests, would be unlikely to stay secret for long. First, the company
asked to make concessions would have a strong interest in revealing any request in order to discredit the dissident group. Second, if
231

See Editorial, Alinsky Wins at the SEC, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 2010, at A14.
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several shareholders must join the dissident group to satisfy the
ownership threshold requirements, the likelihood of a leak from
some member of the dissident group would increase. Third, the
formation of a shareholder group would become public knowledge.232 Once it becomes known that such a shareholder group was
formed, that it threatened to make, but never did make, a proxy
access nomination (or that it made one and withdrew it), and that
around the same time the company changed its position on some
matter of public policy or took some other action to benefit the
special interests of these shareholders, then other market participants could deduce the link between these events. And once a
shareholder has been publicly exposed, any future nominations by
that shareholder would lack credibility.
Put differently, it is exactly because market participants would
be attuned to the danger that some shareholders could abuse proxy
access that it is unlikely that such abuse would result in more than
sporadic harm.
C. Recalcitrant Companies
As we argued in Parts III and IV, we believe that withhold campaigns and traditional proxy contests are generally more effective
ways for activists to achieve their goals than proxy access contests.
Some companies, however, may lose a withhold campaign and still
not mend their ways: the director at issue stays on the board and is
re-nominated, and the board does not address the issue that
prompted the high withhold vote or otherwise shape up. In these
situations, the shareholders’ only recourse will be to withhold their
votes again or to start a traditional proxy contest. For these recalcitrant companies—which will overwhelmingly be micro-cap and
small-cap companies—giving shareholders the additional option of
proxy access may have some beneficial effects. Having snubbed
shareholders once, the company stands an increased chance of losing in a proxy access contest. The case for the nominee is relatively
simple and has some inherent appeal: the board ignored shareholder wishes expressed in a majority withhold vote and thus
232
The knowledge will become public either because the attempt to form a group
triggers filing requirements under Rules 14a-b(1) or (7) or because of the large number of persons who will become aware of the attempts to form a group.
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stronger steps are needed. The threat of a specific board nominee
generating such intense opposition from shareholders may induce
the company to replace that nominee with a more acceptable candidate.
This being said, one should not overstate the resulting benefits
of proxy access. First, the number of recalcitrant companies is
small. For 2009, there were only 11 companies in the Russell 3000
in which one or more director received a majority withhold vote
and the company failed to make a satisfactory response.
Second, for some recalcitrant companies, it may be difficult to
satisfy the shareholder requirements for a proxy access nomination. The activist public pension funds and labor funds may not
have sufficient shares, and mutual funds and other institutions may
not be willing to make a nomination. Instead, it may be both easier
and more promising to make a Rule 14a-8 proposal forcing these
companies to adopt a majority standard for director election.
Third, it is not at all certain that recalcitrant companies would
respond positively to the possible or actual election of a dissident
director. Truly recalcitrant companies may just ignore the dissident
director and push her to the sidelines by not putting her on any important board committee. Other companies may campaign heavily
against the election of such a director.
Fourth, even if a minority of dissident directors were to be
elected to the boards of some of these companies and succeeded in
inducing some changes, it is unclear whether they will have major
effects on company value. To be sure, such companies may make
some actual or perceived improvements in their corporate governance such as destaggering the board, increasing the number of independent directors, or reducing excessive management compensation. But even to the extent that such changes are desirable, their
effect on company value may be marginal.
As to changes that are likely to have a more significant impact
on company value—such as agreeing to a hostile takeover offer,
replacing management, substantially increasing payouts to shareholders, or making fundamental changes in operations or strategy—we doubt that a proxy access contest would be sufficient to
induce them. Rather, for such changes, especially in recalcitrant
companies, it takes a traditional proxy contest.
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D. Emergence of New Activist
Another possibility is that proxy access would spur a new type of
activism by a new type of activist. Maybe once proxy access is
available, mutual funds and other large institutional holders who
have credibility in the market place and are free of conflicts will finally use the power they have as large shareholders and come together to improve the way companies are run. Maybe proxy access
would lead the Vanguards and Fidelities of the investment world to
add respected and truly independent directors to the boards of
their portfolio companies and to intervene quickly and aggressively
when management fails. Maybe a group of professional independent directors would be assembled who are unaffiliated with dissident shareholders but have strong reputational reasons to act effectively as shareholder representatives and could easily be
nominated by dissidents via proxy access. Maybe. But we think this
is unlikely.
First, proxy access does not fundamentally change the corporate
governance structure. Even without proxy access, mutual funds can
sponsor shareholder resolutions, campaign for withhold votes, run
an election contest, or ask a company and its nominating committee to place a certain person on the board. Many nominating committees will be perfectly happy to nominate a well-qualified and
willing director candidate suggested by a Vanguard or Fidelity.
Proxy access affords just one more option for activism. Though different from the existing options, we do not see why this option
would induce activism by groups of shareholders who, in the past,
have only become active in very limited circumstances where the
activism had an immediate and material effect on the share price—
such as pressuring boards not to block a hostile bid or to seek a
higher price in a friendly merger.
Second, we do not think that most mutual funds are structured
to become activists. Mutual funds largely compete on the basis of
offering diversification, low expenses, and superior stock selection
ability. They do not specialize in improving operations. Mutual
funds like Third Avenue, which are more activist, behave like activist hedge funds: they identify companies with operational or
strategic problems, take a significant equity stake, and then work
to make improvements. But those mutual funds that specialize in
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activism will, just like hedge funds, prefer to pursue more expensive routes which offer higher chances of success.
Third, mutual funds have been, and will remain, reluctant to put
their own portfolio managers or other employees on the board of
portfolio companies. Having such directors would arguably give
the fund access to non-public information, which would greatly impede its ability to trade in the company’s stock. Mutual funds, of
course, could nominate an unaffiliated outsider to the board. But
even if a competent outsider could be found, it is unclear how
much difference her presence on the board would make. If the
presence of the dissident nominee makes little difference, why
even bother nominating one?
Finally, the notion that mutual funds would commence waging
successful proxy access contests requires significant leaps of faith.
As discussed in Part II, mutual funds led not a single traditional
contest between 2005 and 2009. Moreover, hedge funds and individuals who have started contests would have had a much lower
success rate had they used proxy access rather than traditional contests. The notion that mutual funds will now wage successful contests via proxy access requires one to believe that (i) mutual funds
would have been highly successful in the past had they waged traditional contests (and will thus remain reasonably successful even if
they wage proxy access contests); (ii) funds nevertheless did not
wage any traditional contests because the costs outweighed the
benefits for every single fund and every single portfolio company;
and (iii) the small reduction in costs generated by proxy access will
change this calculus even though proxy access contests entail a
lower likelihood of success. We are skeptical that anyone seriously
holds these views.
In sum, we are highly doubtful that proxy access would be the
start of a new dawn in mutual fund activism. If proxy access does
anything, it would be an additional, but largely ineffective weapon
in the toolbox of those investors who were already engaged in activism before the passage of proxy access.
CONCLUSION
There is something seductive about “ballot access” for shareholders. After all, as Chancellor Allen noted over 20 years ago,
“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
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which the legitimacy of directorial power rests.”233 Perhaps the
ideological status of shareholder voting explains the vehemence of
the battle over proxy access and has clouded the views of the partisans on both sides to the fact that proxy access would have minimal
practical significance.
Any incremental reform to increase shareholder access to the
corporate proxy must be evaluated against the backdrop of the existing structures and players in corporate governance. The impact
of proxy access can only be understood in comparison to traditional proxy fights and other modes of shareholder involvement,
including “just vote no” campaigns and shareholder proposals.
When one takes account of institutional detail, it becomes clear
that, for multiple reasons, neither the proxy access rule adopted by
the SEC nor any revised rule is likely to be important. Very few
shareholders will qualify for proxy access. Of those who would
qualify, the most important ones—mutual funds, private pension
funds, and many public pension funds—have shown no taste for
this type of activism. Even for those shareholders interested in activism, and even if shareholders not presently interested were to
develop an interest, proxy access entails severe disadvantages.
Thus, traditional proxy fights and other modes of shareholder involvement would often represent far better options for challenging
incumbent management. Shareholders who do use proxy access
would thus reveal themselves as busybodies, unserious about winning elections but all too happy to stir up publicity and controversy. What then, fellow shareholders may wonder, is their motivation? A union-affiliated fund may be seeking to advance labor
interests. A social responsibility fund may be seeking publicity for
its causes. Public pension funds may be pursuing political goals and
publicity for board members who are elected officials or may be
acting at the behest of union representatives on the fund’s board.
The inherent strategic disadvantages of proxy access, coupled with
these concerns, mean that the few initiated contests would likely
fail. As long as companies understand this, the threat of using
proxy access would not be an effective tool to extract concessions.
But ultimately, the insignificance of proxy access turns on a
more fundamental issue. According to urban legend, the famous
233

Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 652, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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bank robber Willie Sutton, when asked why he was robbing banks,
234
answered: “Because that’s where the money is.” Willie Sutton
has a lot to teach to proponents of proxy access. Even if all the
other problems of proxy access could be magically overcome, it
would still have a limited impact for one simple reason: the cost
savings targeted by proxy access are not where the money is. Director election contests involve complex issues, much more than
shareholder proposals and withhold campaigns. The cost savings
entailed by proxy access involve such a small part of the expenses it
takes to wage a serious contest, and such a small fraction of the
stake of any dissident who would be taken seriously, that it is implausible that they would generate large effects.
Shareholder activists who support proxy access are barking up
the wrong tree if they think that a proxy access rule is a useful way
to energize board governance. At best, it is symbolic politics in a
world in which there are already easier, cheaper, and more effective measures such as targeted “withhold vote” campaigns.
A more serious means to invigorate shareholder voting would
provide a mechanism to reimburse successful dissidents—and perhaps even those who gain high levels, but less than a majority of,
shareholder support—for all or part of their reasonable campaign
expenses. That’s where the money is. The recently enacted Section
113 of the Delaware General Corporate Law provides a roadmap
for shareholders who want to adopt bylaws to provide for such reimbursement.235 Rather than waste their time and energy on proxy
access, shareholder activists could have developed model bylaw
provisions and pushed boards to adopt them. The SEC, in turn,
could have taken the much less controversial step of revising its
rules to make sure that such bylaw amendments could be introduced as Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals without violating the
various procedural limitations (such as the 500-word limit of such
proposals). Reimbursement that is contingent on success, but that
covers a much greater share of expenses than those avoided by
proxy access, would encourage those shareholders who have a real
shot yet hold the publicity seekers at bay. Whether such a rule

234
See generally, Willie Sutton, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Willie_Sutton (last visited Aug. 29, 2011).
235
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 113 (Supp. 2010).
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would improve corporate governance or increase the value of firms
is beyond the scope of this Article, but at least such a rule could
make a real difference in getting shareholder nominees elected to
corporate boards.

